Amended Complaint

Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***QW
Date: 7/20/2023 1:21 PM
Che Alexander, Clerk
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA
President Donald J. Trump,

Petitioner,
v.
Fani Willis, Esq.,
in her capacity as District Attorney for
the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, No. 2023CV382670
&
Hon. Robert McBurney,
in his capacity as Superior Court
Judge for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit,
Respondents.
A MENDMENT TO P ETI TION FOR W RITS O F M ANDAMUS AND P RO HIBITION

Five days ago, President Donald J. Trump petitioned the Court for writs of
mandamus and prohibition to vindicate breaches of his rights under the Con-
stitutions of the United States and the State of Georgia—every other avenue to
remedy which he has been stripped of. Those breaches persist and, to ensure
the Court can consider the full breadth of Respondents’ transgressions, the re-
lated claims for relief, and the evidence to support both, Petitioner files this
amendment to his 14 July petition, as OCGA § 9-11-15(a) permits.
Reassertion of Original Grounds

(1) To begin, Petitioner reasserts every contention of fact and law contained in
his original, 13 July petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition. Noth-
ing in the last five days has slowed, much less halted, Respondents’ tres-
passes on Petitioner’s rights, or the imminent harm they portend. To the
contrary, every sign points to Respondents’ staying the course—Peti-
tioner’s rights notwithstanding. Indeed, it is because Respondents remain
undeterred that Petitioner files this amendment.
1
Incorporation of Arguments and Evidence
(2) As indicated above and in his original petition, Petitioner asserted these
claims in a motion filed under No. 2022EX24, albeit differently struc-
tured. That motion, along with its exhibits, are the background of and
foundation for this petition. Petitioner has attached those documents as
exhibits to this amendment and incorporates their substance. See OCGA
§ 9-11-10(c). That document and its exhibits are:
• Ex. 1: Mot. to Quash Special Purpose Grand Jury Report, Preclude

the Use of Evid. Derived Therefrom & Disqualify the Fulton County
Dist. Att’y’s Off. (Mar. 20, 2023);
― Ex. 1-1: Ord. Approving Req. for Special Purpose Grand Jury
(Jan. 24, 2021);
― Ex. 1-2: Ltr. Req. Special Purpose Grand Jury (Jan. 20, 2021) ;
― Ex. 1-3: Tr. of Special Purpose Grand Jury Hr’g before Hon.
Robert C. McBurney (Jan. 24, 2023);
― Ex. 1-4: Ord. Disqualifying Dist. Att’y’s Off. as to Sen. Jones

Only (Jul. 25, 2022);
― Ex. 1-5: List of Fulton Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Media Appearances

and Social Media Posts;
― Ex. 1-6: Ord. Dissolving Special Purpose Grand Jury & Setting
Hr’g on Publication (Jan. 9, 2023);
― Ex. 1-7: Ord. re: Special Purpose Grand Jury’s Final Report
(Feb. 13, 2023);
― Ex. 1-8: List of Grand Jury Foreperson’s Media Appearances;
― Ex. 1-9: List of Supervising J.’s Media Appearances;
― Ex. 1-10: Ord. Den. Gov. Kemp’s Mot. to Quash (Aug. 29,
2022);
2
Robert C.I. McBurney (Aug. 25, 2022);
Robert C.I. McBurney (Jul. 25, 2022);
― Ex. 1-13: Ord. Den. Mot. to Recons. Disqualification Req. (Aug.

25, 2022);
― Ex. 1-14: Cert. of Material Witness Pursuant to the Unif. Act to

Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State
(OCGA § 24-13-90 et seq.) (Sen. Lindsey Graham); (Jul. 11,
2022);
― Ex. 1-15: Cert. of Material Witness Pursuant to the Unif. Act to

Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State
(OCGA § 24-13-90 et seq.) (Mark Meadows); (Aug. 25, 2022);
and
― Ex. 1-16: Ord. Entering Portions of the Special Purpose Grand

Jury’s Final Report into Ct. Rec. (Jan. 16, 2023).
(3) Petitioner’s filings in No. 2022EX24 do not paint the whole picture. To
fairly assess the legal errors that have brought Petitioner to this point, the
Court should consider the State and intervenors’ filings, too. Thus, in addi-
tion to the documents under ¶ (2), Petitioner includes as exhibits to this
amendment:
• Ex. 2: State’s Resp. to Mot. (May 15, 2023); and
• Ex. 3: Br. of Media Intervenors in Supp. of the Pub. Filing of the

Grand Jury Report (Jan. 23, 2023).
(4) Finally in this vein, Petitioner alerts the Court to further, recently revealed,
extrajudicial evidence in support of his contentions. These additional items
bear principally on the need for the District Attorney’s disqualification from
the recently initiated grand-jury proceedings. They include the District
3
Attorney’s recent campaign-finance disclosures, which lay bare her disqual-
ifying personal interest in this case.
• Ex. 4: Campaign finance disclosures.1
(5) Placed next to her extrajudicial social media posts about Petitioner and her
pursuit of him—themselves a violation of Ga. R. Professional Con-
duct 3.8(f), the District Attorney’s campaign-finance disclosures expose
that she is fundraising for her reelection campaign on the back of this case,
just as Petitioner has previously argued:
(a) The District Attorney personally retweeted requests for followers and
campaign donations which referenced her prosecution of this investi-
gation. Not only did her followers grow nearly 100-fold (from a couple
thousand to one-hundred thousand) in a matter of days, but her cam-
paign also gained most of its 2022 donations as a result of those ef-
forts.2
(b) In 2022, according to her campaign disclosure report, the District At-
torney received a total of 737 donations—533 of those donations came
in the days immediately following her retweeting requests for dona-
tions and followers in light of this investigation, which Petitioner
highlighted in his original motion. See Motion to Quash, attached
hereto as Exhibit 1, Sec. 4(B)(ii). To be clear, those donations com-
prise 72.3% of the District Attorney’s 2022 individual campaign.3 De-
spite the District Attorney being a state prosecutor in a single-county
circuit, less than 8% of her donations came from Georgians. The other
92% were from 45 other states.
1 This is a redacted version of the District Attorney’s 2022 Campaign Finance Disclo-
sure Report, having removed personally identifiable information. The full, unredacted
report is available on the Georgia Campaign Finance Systems website at
www.efile.ethics.ga.gov.
2 This information was unavailable to Petitioner until June 29, 2023 when the District
Attorney filed her 2022 campaign disclosure report.

3 All cited percentages relate to the number of contributions not the monetary amount
of such contributions.
4
Clarification of Disqualification Argument
(6) When Petitioner first urged the District Attorney’s disqualification from
this matter, the special purpose grand jury had been dissolved and a regu-
lar grand jury had not yet been impaneled. Consequently, the District At-
torney rejoined, inter alia, that Petitioner’s challenge was untimely. That
was then, however.
(7) Now, regarding this investigation, the District Attorney has indicated pub-
licly that she is seeking a bill of indictment from a regular grand jury which
was empaneled last week. Regardless of whether Petitioner’s disqualifica-
tion claim vis-à-vis the special purpose grand jury’s proceeding was timely,
his claim vis-à-vis the regular grand jury is. See generally Shuttleworth v.
Rankin-Shuttleworth of Georgia, LLC, 328 Ga. App. 593, 596 (2014) (ex-
plaining how courts evaluate the timeliness of a disqualification chal-
lenge).
(8) Further, the parties debated the correct standard for disqualifying a prose-
cutor because of an actual conflict of interest, as opposed to forensic mis-
conduct. Petitioner relied on Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481
U.S. 787 (1987), which the District Attorney claimed was inapposite.
(9) Lest there be any doubt, Young sets out the due process standard for dis-
qualifying a prosecutor. It stands for the proposition that the presence of a
prosecutor who has an actual conflict of interest requires disqualification,
without further inquiry into whether the conflict affected the prosecutor’s
conduct.
(a) In Young, a federal district presiding over a trademark dispute

awarded the plaintiffs an injunction, which defendants subsequently
violated, subjecting them to contempt. 481 U.S. at 790–91. The dis-
trict court appointed plaintiff’s counsel, who still represented plain-
tiffs and who had secured from them the injunction, to represent the
government in a criminal contempt proceeding. Id. at 791.
(b) The actual conflict between the lawyers’ duty to zealously advocate for
plaintiffs (whose interests were contrary to defendants’) was in
5
hopeless conflict with their obligation as prosecutors to see justice
done in the criminal matter. Id. at 803–05; accord Ga. R. Prof. Con-
duct 1.7(d).
(c) “Regardless of whether the appointment of private counsel in this case

resulted in any prosecutorial impropriety,” the Court held, “that ap-
pointment illustrates the potential for private interest to influence the
discharge of public duty.” Young, 481 U.S. at 805 (emphasis original).
Thus, it mattered not whether the appointed prosecutors would have
behaved identically had they not had conflicting duties; that they were
laboring under the actual conflict, without more, tainted the proceed-
ings. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (holding that a
defendant predicating an ineffective-assistance claim on defense
counsel’s having labored under an actual conflict of interest must
show that the conflict affected the representation).
(d) Thus, to prevail under Young, Petitioner need show only that the Dis-
trict Attorney is laboring under an actual conflict of interest. He need
not prove that she behaved differently because of the conflict than she
would have without it. Neither can she claim a lack of effect as a de-
fense. That the District Attorney is conflicted, without more, under-
mines the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.
(10) The District Attorney is indeed laboring under an actual conflict in the reg-
ular grand jury proceedings. The Respondent Superior Court Judge al-
ready found that the District Attorney’s having hosted a fundraiser for a
target’s political opponent constituted an actual conflict. Thus, “there
[was] a significant risk that … [her] duties to … a third person [would] ma-
terially and adversely affect” her duty to impartially seek justice in the case
underlying this petition. Ga. R. Professional Conduct 1.7(a). That was and
is enough to require her disqualification under Young.
(11) If the Court requires more, however, the District Attorney has provided it:
She has personally inserted herself into Twitter campaigns requesting do-
nations and followers while referencing her prosecution of this case.
6
What’s more, she retweeted a political cartoon depicting Petitioner in a
negative light.4 For a District Attorney to personally request donations and
followers based on the prosecution or investigation of one named individ-
ual, especially when it heightens public condemnation of the accused, is
clear evidence of conflict. The District Attorney’s desire to fund her reelec-
tion incentivizes her to pursue Petitioner more aggressively than she oth-
erwise might. See Ga. R. Prof. Conduct 3.8(a). So again, “there is a signifi-
cant risk that the [District Attorney’s] own interests … will materially and
adversely affect” her obligation to impartially administer justice in her at-
tempts to indict Petitioner. Ga. R. Professional Conduct 1.7(a) emphasis
added. In such circumstances, Young requires her disqualification. Alt-
hough it may inevitably be the case that the public’s interest in a prosecu-
tion will drive donations for a prosecutor’s reelection, here, the District At-
torney’s personal involvement in those efforts and her use of politically
charged material in so doing creates the conflict which requires her dis-
qualification. Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015).
Conclusion
As with last week’s submission, Petitioner now awaits the product of Re-
spondents’ constitutionally flawed process. Petitioner cannot sit on his hands
while a prosecutor with a disqualifying personal interest uses unconstitution-
ally obtained evidence to drag him ultimately into a courtroom. Petitioner re-
quests that this Court issue a Mandamus Nisi and that the matter be scheduled
pursuant to the emergency motions provision set forth in Uniform Superior
Court Rule 6.7.
4In Respondent’s brief in Response to Petitioner’s Motion to Quash, the State errone-
ously indicated that Petitioner (“Movant”) was not depicted in that cartoon. That is not
the case.
7
Respectfully submitted on 19 July 2023 by:
s:\ Drew Findling

D REW F INDLING
Ga. Bar No. 260425
s:\ Marissa Goldberg

M ARISSA G OLDBERG
Ga. Bar No. 672798
Findling Law Firm
3575 Piedmont Road
Tower 15, Suite 1010
Atlanta, Georgia 30305
(404) 460-4500
drew@findlinglawfirm.com
marissa@findlinglawfirm.com
s:\ Jennifer Little

J ENNIFER L ITTLE
Ga. Bar No. 141596
Jennifer Little Law, LLC
400 Galleria Parkway SE
Suite 1920
(404) 947-7778
jlittle@jllaw.com
Counsel for President Donald J. Trump
8
STATE OF GEORGIA
President Donald J. Trump,

Petitioner,
v.
Fani Willis, Esq.,
in her capacity as District Attorney for
the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, No. 2023CV382670
&
Hon. Robert McBurney,
in his capacity as Superior Court
Judge for the Atlanta Judicial Circuit,
Respondents.
C ERTIFICATE OF S E RVICE
This is to certify that I have on this day served copies of the
within Amendment to Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibi-
tion to via email to:
Fani Willis, Esq.
Fulton County District Attorney
136 Pryor St. SW
Hon. Robert McBurney

185 Central Ave SW
Judges Chambers # 8855
Soo Jo
County Attorney
141 Pryor St SW, Ste. 4038
9
Respectfully submitted,
s:\ Drew Findling

D REW F INDLING
Ga. Bar No. 260425
10
Exhibit 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………..……….…….6
.
II. STANDING………………………………………………………………….………10
III. THE GEORGIA STATUES AUTHORIZING THE USE OF A SPECIAL

PURPOSE GRAND JURY ARE UNCONSITUTIONAL……………..……………13
A. The Statutes are Unconstitutional Due to Vagueness……………………………15
i. The Statutes Are Vague as to Whether the SPGJ is a Civil or

Criminal Body……………………………………………………...16
ii. The Statutes Are Vague as to the Contents and Release of the
Report(s)……………………………………………….…………..19
B. The Statutes are Unconstitutional As Applied to This SPGJ……….……………21
i. The Supervising Judge Improperly Designated the SPGJ as a

Criminal Investigative Body when Case Law Mandates it is
Civil………………………………………………………………..22
ii. The SPGJ Improperly Compelled the Appearance and Testimony

of Out-of-State Witnesses………………………………………….25
C. The Statutes were Unconstitutionally Applied to this SPGJ if Classified as

Criminal………………………………………………………………………….26
i. The FCDA’s Arbitrary Use and Subsequent Abandonment of

“Target” Statuses Violated Principles of Fundamental Fairness…..27
ii. Jurors Improperly Drew Adverse Inferences from Witnesses’

Invocation of the Fifth Amendment………………………………..30
IV. THE FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE MUST BE

DISQUALIFIED……………………………………………………….…………….31
A. The Supervising Judge Should Have Disqualified the FCDA from the Entire
Investigation Rather than Just a Witness…………………………………...……33
B. The FCDA’s Public Statements Violate Prosecutorial Standards, Constitute

Forensic Misconduct, and Create the Appearance of Impropriety Requiring
Disqualification…………………………………………………………………..36
.
2
i. The FCDA’s Statements to the Press Violate Prosecutorial
Standards and Constitute Forensic Misconduct…..…………….....37
ii. The FCDA’s Online Activity Violates Prosecutorial Standards

and Creates the Appearance of Impropriety………….….…..…….39
V. THE PUBLIC COMMENTS MADE BY THE FOREPERSON AND GRAND

JURORS REVEAL THAT THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDING WAS TAINTED
BY IMPROPER INFLUENCES, INCOMPLETE OR INACCURATE
INSTRUCTIONS, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFERENCES…...……...…….43
VI. THE SUPERVISING JUDGE VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES

IMPACTED BY THIS INVESTIGATION………………………………...………..48
A. The Supervising Judge Made Prejudicial Statements Regarding Witnesses’

Invocation of the Fifth Amendment………………………………………….…..48
VII. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………50
3
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
Exhibit 1: January 24, 2021 Order Approving Request for Special Purpose Grand Jury, In re 2
May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).
Exhibit 2: January 20, 2021 Letter Requesting Special Purpose Grand Jury.
Exhibit 3: Transcript of January 24, 2023 Special Purpose Grand Jury Hearing
before the Honorable Robert C.I. McBurney, Atlanta Georgia, In re 2 May 2022
Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).
Exhibit 4: July 25, 2022 Order Disqualifying District Attorney’s Office as to Senator Jones
Only, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co.
Sup. Court).
Exhibit 5: List of Fulton County District Attorney’s Media Appearances and Social Media Posts.
Exhibit 6: January 9, 2023 Order Dissolving Special Purpose Grand Jury and
Setting Hearing on Publication, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury,
Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).
Exhibit 7: February 13, 2023 Order Re: Special Purpose Grand Jury’s Final Report, In re 2 May
2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).
Exhibit 8: List of Foreperson’s Media Appearances.
Exhibit 9: List of Supervising Judge’s Media Appearances.
Exhibit 10: August 29, 2022 Order Denying Motion to Quash (Governor Kemp), In re 2 May
2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).
Exhibit 11: Transcript of August 25, 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury Hearing
4
Exhibit 12: Transcript of July 25, 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury Hearing
Exhibit 13: August 25, 2022 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Disqualification Request, In
re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).
Exhibit 14: July 11, 2022 Certificate of Material Witness Pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure
the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, Codified in the State of Georgia as OCGA
24-13-90 et seq (Lindsey Graham), In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No.
2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).
Exhibit 15: August 25, 2022 Certificate of Material Witness Pursuant to the Uniform Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, Codified in the State of Georgia as
OCGA 24-13-90 et seq (Mark Meadows), In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case
No. 2022-EX-000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).
Exhibit 16: January 16, 2023 Ordering Entering Portions of Special Purpose Grand Jury’s Final
Report into Court Record, In re 2 May 2022 Special Purpose Grand Jury, Case No. 2022-EX-
000024 (Fulton Co. Sup. Court).
5
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 24, 2022, the Chief Judge of the Fulton County Superior Court entered an
order approving the request made by the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office (hereinafter
the “FCDA’s Office”) to impanel a special purpose grand jury pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100
et. seq. Ex. 1. The order of the Court merely echoed the recitation of need outlined by the
FCDA’s Office in their letter to the Court which specified:
[A] special purpose grand jury [should] be impaneled for the purpose of investigating
the facts and circumstances relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the
lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia. Ex. 2.
The letter informed the Court that this rarely used investigative body was necessary
because the FCDA’s Office anticipated that the investigation would be a lengthy, complex
process which a regular sitting grand jury wouldn’t be able to complete in addition to their
regular duties. Id. In the letter, the FCDA’s Office made it abundantly clear that they understood
that this SPGJ would be without authority to return an indictment. Id.
The laws that authorized this special purpose grand jury have existed in the Georgia Code
since 1974 but have rarely been utilized and even more rarely litigated. The statutes themselves
are vague and have left much to interpretation; further, the case law regarding the process and
function of the special purpose grand jury is similarly scant, unclear and sometimes
contradictory. This is the framework within which the FCDA’s Office has chosen to undertake
this investigation of undoubtedly historic and national significance. This is the framework which
has been revealed through this process to be erroneous and, more importantly, unconstitutional.
6
For approximately eight months, the SPGJ met at the direction of the FCDA’s Office.
Pursuant to the impaneling order, the Supervising Judge was tasked with overseeing and
assisting the SPGJ as well as charging said grand jury and receiving its reports. Ex. 1. The SPGJ
considered evidence and heard from over 75 witnesses all within the walls of the Fulton County
Justice Center. Ex. 3 at 6 (special purpose grand jury heard testimony from 75 witnesses). Over
those eight months, movant President Donald J. Trump remained a non-witness as he was never
subpoenaed nor asked to testify. Throughout the investigation, the elected District Attorney of
Fulton County Fani Willis (hereinafter referred to as “FCDA”) was the “very public face of this
investigation” and routinely sat for interviews with various media outlets regarding the matter.
Ex. 4 at 3, see also Ex. 5.
The Supervising Judge dissolved the SPGJ on January 9, 2023. Ex. 6. In his order of
dissolution, the Supervising Judge, recognizing that the next steps of this process were unclear,
invited briefing from the FCDA’s Office and the media (notably excluding any other parties
including witnesses and targets), and set a hearing on the issue of publication. Ex. 3 at 2. While
stating the statute directed him to release the report, the Supervising Judge cited due process
concerns in ultimately ruling that only a small portion of the report would become public at that
time. Ex. 7 at 5 (“[T]he consequence of these due process deficiencies is not that the special
purpose grand jury’s final report is forever suppressed or that its recommendations for or against
indictment are in any way flawed or suspect. Rather, the consequence is that those
recommendations are for the District Attorney’s eyes only – for now. Fundamental fairness
requires this[.]”).
However, on February 21, 2023, in contravention of the order of the Supervising Judge,
the nation was given a view inside the SPGJ process when, in a bizarre turn of events, the SPGJ
7
foreperson engaged in a media tour where she shared the specifics of her experience publicly.2
Ex. 8. The foreperson’s public comments reveal that both the procedures set forth for the SPGJ,
as well as the application of those procedures by the Supervising Judge and the FCDA’s Office,
failed to protect the most basic procedural and substantive constitutional rights of all individuals
discussed by this investigative body. Compounding the harm inflicted by the foreperson’s public
comments, the Supervising Judge then gave numerous media interviews despite still presiding
over this pending matter. Ex. 9.
This motion addresses the following issues which violate the principles of fundamental
fairness and due process: (1) the unconstitutionality of the special purpose grand jury statutes as
set forth in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq., both facially and as applied in this case, (2) the
existing, actual conflict suffered by the FCDA’s Office (specifically the FCDA) which has been
exacerbated by instances of forensic misconduct and improper extrajudicial activity such that the
FCDA’s Office must be disqualified from this matter, (3) the unconstitutional taint infecting the
grand jury proceeding and the corresponding taint on the potential grand jury (and petit jury)
pool, and (4) the unconstitutional taint inflicted on the grand jury proceedings and potential
grand jury (and petit jury) pool by the in-court as well as the extrajudicial statements made by
the Supervising Judge.3
First, the special purpose grand jury statutes are unconstitutionally vague, resulting in
disparate application. The statutes are silent as to key powers and duties of the grand jury, and
they do not prescribe what shall be included in the report, nor do they specify how or if it should
2
Since that time, additional grand jurors have also spoken out. Ex. 8 at No. 11.
3
The concept of fundamental fairness is “essential to the very concept of justice,” and is the
cornerstone of due process. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
8
be disseminated. The failures in the statutory framework directly impact the fundamental fairness
of the proceedings and violate the due process rights of the individuals involved.
Second, the Supervising Judge applied the statutes in a way that violated the due process
rights of the individuals involved when he held, contrary to Georgia precedent, that this SPGJ
was a criminal grand jury. That determination had a negative ripple effect on the constitutional
integrity of the entire process as it permitted the compulsion of testimony from out-of-state
witnesses and impacted the application of core constitutional privileges such as the Fifth
Amendment and sovereign immunity.
Third, the Supervising Judge improperly disqualified the FCDA’s Office from
investigating a singular target when it was instead required to exclude the FCDA’s Office from
the entire investigation. The resulting prejudicial taint cannot be excised from the results of the
investigation or any future prosecution by the FCDA’s Office. Additionally, the FCDA’s media
interviews violate prosecutorial standards and constitute forensic misconduct, and her social
media activity creates the appearance of impropriety compounding the necessity for
disqualification.
Fourth, the foreperson’s and grand jurors’ comments illuminate the lack of proper
instruction and supervision over the grand jury relating to clear evidentiary matters which
violates the notions of fundamental fairness and due process. The results of the investigation
cannot be relied upon and, therefore, must be suppressed given the constitutional violations. The
foreperson’s public comments in and of themselves likewise violate notions of fundamental
fairness and due process and taint any future grand jury pool.
9
Finally, the Supervising Judge’s improper conduct tainted the proceeding and similarly
violated notions of fundamental fairness and due process. The Supervising Judge made
inappropriate and prejudicial comments relating to the conduct under investigation as well as
potential witnesses’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment. He improperly applied the law and
subsequently denied appellate review while knowing his application of the law in that manner
had vast implications on the constitutionality of the investigation. His nexus to certain aspects of
the SPGJ and subsequent drafting of the report, in combination with his prior rulings, necessitate
review by the Chief Judge of the Fulton County Superior Court.
Accordingly, President Donald J. Trump hereby moves to quash the SPGJ’s report and
preclude the use of any evidence derived therefrom, as it was conducted under an
unconstitutional statute, through an illegal and unconstitutional process, and by a disqualified
District Attorney’s Office who violated prosecutorial standards and acted with disregard for the
gravity of the circumstances and the constitutional rights of those involved. Movant further
requests that this Court disqualify the FCDA from any further proceedings in this matter,
including any indictments and/or prosecutions, as her disqualifying conflict already found by the
Supervising Judge commanded and commands this result.
II. STANDING
Although Movant, President Donald J. Trump, was not a witness who appeared before
the SPGJ, his constitutional rights are clearly implicated in this matter. Georgia jurisprudence
broadly recognizes standing of non-parties whose rights have or may be infringed upon by the
illegal acts of the State or unconstitutional statutes to challenge the same: “[I]t has been
recognized that the only prerequisite to attacking the constitutionality of a statute ‘is a showing
that it is hurtful to the attacker.’” Bo Fancy Prods. V. Rabun Cty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 267 Ga. 341,
10
344 (1996) (quoting Stewart v. Davidson, 218 Ga. 760, 764 (1963)). “In order to challenge a
statute or an administrative action taken pursuant to a statute, the plaintiff must normally show
that it has interests or rights which are or will be affected by the statute or the action.” Atlanta
Taxicab Co. Owners Ass’n v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 342, 345 (2006) (quoting Preservation
Alliance of Savannah v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 202 Ga. App. 116, 117 (1991) (emphasis
added)). Additionally, under Georgia law, parties impacted by grand jury reports have standing
to challenge the release of those reports. See In re Floyd County Grand Jury Presentments for
May Term 1996, 225 Ga. App. 705 (1997) (Attorney General entitled to expungement of grand
jury report); In re July-August, 2003 County Grand Jury, 265 Ga. App. 870 (2004) (DeKalb
County CEO entitled to expungement of ultra vires portions of report); Kelley v. Tanksley, 105
Ga. App. 65 (1961) (Solicitor entitled to partial expungement of report which by implication and
innuendo accused him of malpractice).
President Trump was inextricably intertwined with this investigation since its inception.
The efforts under investigation squarely relate to his bid for a second term as President of the
United States. The investigation began as a result of a conference call amongst numerous parties
including Secretary of State Raffensperger and President Trump, and the call was the first piece
of evidence reviewed by the SPGJ.4 President Trump was mentioned in every news report and
virtually every filing related to this matter and has remained a central figure, both in public
perception and the court record, throughout this investigation.5 Each time the FCDA and
4
See The Fulton County District Attorney ’s Letter, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/202 02/ O/us/politics/letters-to-georgia-officials-from-
fulton-district-attorney.html; See also, Ex. 8 at No. 2.
5
See Docket, Fulton County Clerk Superior & Magistrate Courts,
http://www.fultonclerk.org/DocumentCenter/Index/94?GridorderBy=LastModifiedDate-desc
(last visited Mar. 17, 2023).
11
Supervising Judge subpoenaed an out-of-state witness, President Trump or the Trump Campaign
was mentioned in the language of the certificate of need as well as the order compelling that
witness’s testimony; the same was true for most motions filed in the matter. Id.
Furthermore, the FCDA has spoken to the media nearly forty times regarding this
investigation and each news report references President Trump. Ex. 5. In interviews, the FCDA
directly responded when asked about President Trump and personally referred to him by name.
Id. at No. 20. On multiple occasions, she discussed subpoenaing President Trump and intimated
he was the target of the investigation. See Ex. 5. In response to the question of whether President
Trump would be subpoenaed, FCDA responded, “it is foreseeable that I would subpoena the
target of this investigation… A target.” Id. at No. 27. Even when not referring to him by name,
she implied she was speaking about President Trump. Id. at No. 7 (“Nobody is above the
law…”); Id. at No. 25 (“It’s not much consequence what title they wore….”); Id. at No. 22
(“Everybody is equal before the law no matter what position they hold, no matter how much
wealth…”); Id. at No. 25 (“I’m not taking on a former president. We’re not adversaries. I don’t
know him personally. He does not know me personally.”). In her first interview live on national
television, FCDA opined about President Trump’s mens rea during his call with Secretary of
State Brad Raffensperger. 6
6
“When any prosecutor throughout this country is interviewing people trying to determine if a
crime was committed, and if they understood what they were doing, the mens rea is always
important. So you look at facts to see, ‘did they really have intent?’ [or] ‘did they really
understand what they were doing?’ Detailed facts become important like, asking for a specific
number and then going back to investigate and understand that that number is just one more than
the number that is needed. It let’s you know that someone had a clear mind. They understood
what they were doing, and so when you are pursuing the investigation, facts like that that may
not seem so important, become very important.” Ex. 5 at No. 4.
12
The foreperson of the SPGJ likewise spoke freely (and directly) about President Trump in
each of her interviews:
I will tell you that it was a process where we heard his name a lot. We definitely heard a
lot about former President Trump, and we definitely discussed him a lot in the room.
And I will say that when this list comes out... there are no major plot twists waiting for
you….We heard a lot of recordings of President Trump on the phone… It is amazing how
many hours of footage you can find of that man on the phone… I could see how getting
the former president to talk to us would have been a year in negotiation by itself…I’d be
fascinated by what he [Trump] said, but do you think he would come in and say anything
groundbreaking or just the same kinda thing we’ve heard?
Ex. 8 at Nos. 3, 4, 5.
The investigation began as a result of the phone call between Secretary of State
Raffensperger, President Trump, and others, but came to encompass a variety of actions related
to President Trump’s candidacy in the 2020 Election. He was mentioned in nearly every
interview given by the FCDA as well as the foreperson, and President Trump himself or the 2020
Election was referenced in virtually every court filing. In short, President Trump’s rights have
been implicated pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution as well as Ga. Const. Art. I, § I, Paras. I and XVI and, therefore, he has standing to
make these constitutional, legal, and procedural challenges.
III. THE GEORGIA STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE USE OF A SPECIAL

PURPOSE GRAND JURY ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Georgia legislature enacted the special purpose grand jury statutes in 1974. See
O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq. These statutes authorize the creation of a county-wide special
purpose grand jury for the purpose of investigating any alleged violation of the laws of this state
13
or any other matter subject to investigation by grand juries, and the statutes grant special purpose
grand juries compulsory subpoena power.7 Additionally, O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101 states in part:
Once impaneled, the chief judge shall assign a superior court judge to supervise and
assist the special grand jury in carrying out its investigation and duties. The judge so
assigned shall charge the special grand jury as to its powers and duties and shall require
periodic reports of the special grand jury's progress, as well as a final report. When the
judge assigned to a special grand jury decides that the special grand jury's investigation
has been completed or on the issuance of a report by the special grand jury of the matter
investigated by it reporting that the investigation has been completed, the judge so
assigned shall recommend to the chief judge that the special grand jury be dissolved.
In practice, these statutes have been infrequently utilized. In those rare cases where they
are invoked, special purpose grand juries typically investigate governmental entities and/or
employees and issue diverse reports contemplating a wide range of legal options including both
criminal and non-criminal, legislative, administrative, or governmental recommendations.8 Since
7
“While conducting any investigation authorized by this part, investigative grand juries may
compel evidence and subpoena witnesses; may inspect records, documents, correspondence, and
books of any department, agency, board, bureau, commission, institution, or authority of the state
or any of its political subdivisions; and may require the production of records, documents,
correspondence, and books of any person, firm, or corporation which relate directly or indirectly
to the subject of the investigation being conducted by the investigative grand jury.” O.C.G.A. §
15-12-100.
8
Special Purpose Grand Jury Final Report, CHAMPION NEWSPAPER (August 21, 2013), Civil
Action No. 13CV1024, https://thechampionnewspaper.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/000SpecialPurposeGrandJuryFinalReport.pdf (DeKalb County SPGJ
investigated allegations of public corruption surrounding the awarding of contracts within the
Watershed Management Department); Cobb County, Ga., Laptop Plan to Be Probed by Grand
Jury, MACDAILYNEWS (October 10, 2005), Civil Action No. 05-1-8242,
https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/cobb-county-ga-laptop-plan-to-be-probed-by-grand-
jury/2005/10 (Cobb County SPGJ investigated alleged bias and deception in the bidding of a
computer laptop program); State v. Lampl, 296 Ga. 892 (2015) (Clayton County SPGJ
investigating public corruption and various crimes allegedly committed by currently or
previously elected county officials and county employees); Kenerly v. State, 311 Ga. App. 190
(2011) (Gwinnett SPGJ investigating suspected criminal activity surrounding the acquisition of
real property at fraudulently inflated prices).
14
their enactment, no appellate court has examined the constitutionality of the special purpose
grand jury statutes.
A. The Statutes Are Unconstitutional Due to Vagueness.
It is well-established that “a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause
if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits
or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited
and what is not in each particular case.” Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966)
(Citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)). In Giaccio, the Supreme Court reviewed a
Pennsylvania statute that governed the procedure by which jurors determined court costs to be
paid by an acquitted defendant. See 382 U.S. at 401. The Court held that “the law must be one
that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards that courts must enforce.” Id. at 403.
Accordingly, the Court found the statute unconstitutionally vague because it invited arbitrary
enforcement. Id. (statue allowed jurors to “make determinations of the crucial issue upon their
own notions of what the law should be instead of what it is.”). Similarly, in Jekyll Island State
Park Civic Auth. v. Jekyll Island Citizens Ass’n., 266 Ga. 152 (1996), the Georgia Supreme
Court held that a portion of a civil statute was unconstitutional because it was vague and
indefinite, as it contained “insufficient objective standards and guidelines to meet the
requirements of Due Process.” Jekyll Island, 266 Ga. at 153.
The statutes governing the special purpose grand jury, O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100, et. seq., are
so standardless that they have invited arbitrary, amorphous enforcement by the FCDA’s Office
and the Supervising Judge. First, they fail to specify whether a SPGJ is a criminal or civil
proceeding (or whether a SPGJ can be either depending on its scope and purpose). Second, the
statutes lack specificity as to the form and substance of the report, the rights of individuals
15
named in the report, and the publication of the SPGJ’s final report. Third, they fail to identify
with adequate specificity the roles and responsibilities of the Supervising Judge versus the body
requesting the investigation, here the FCDA.
i. The Statutes are Vague as to Whether the SPGJ is a Civil or Criminal Body.
The central constitutional concern at issue here is the conflicting interpretation of the
statute - whether the SPGJ is a criminal or civil investigative body. This issue has been argued
and repeated by numerous parties during the course of this proceeding with inconsistent and/or
unsupported holdings by the Supervising Judge as well as courts in other jurisdictions. The fact
that such a foundational aspect of this procedure is unclear under the law is definitive evidence
that the statutes are overly vague and unconstitutional on their face.
Even though the Supervising Judge declared that this SPGJ was a criminal investigative
grand jury, he offered no basis for this conclusion other than asserting that the impaneling order
and scope of the investigation determined the nature of the grand jury proceeding.9 There is no
Georgia authority that supports the Supervising Judge’s theory that the stated purpose of the
investigation determines the nature of the body. The decision as to whether the SPGJ is a civil or
criminal body is of the utmost significance, as it impacts whether the SPGJ can compel the
attendance of out-of-state witnesses, what (if any) inferences can be made upon assertions of
privilege, the applicability of sovereign immunity, and more. On these issues, the statutes are
silent which renders them unconstitutionally vague.
9
“Its purpose is unquestionably and exclusively to conduct a criminal investigation; its
convening was sought by the elected official who investigates, lodges, and prosecutes criminal
charges in this Circuit, its convening Order specifies its purpose as the investigation of possible
criminal activities; and its final output is a report recommending whether criminal charges
should be brought.” Ex. 10 at 4.
16
The issue of whether the SPGJ is a civil or criminal proceeding came to have
constitutional implications when the FCDA’s office sought to compel the attendance of out-of-
state witnesses. Civil and criminal compulsory powers differ greatly, and the FCDA compelled
testimony from out-of-state witnesses utilizing criminal compulsory power via the Uniform Act
to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State (hereinafter “Uniform Act”),
O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et. seq., which can only be utilized in criminal proceedings. Indeed, in the
Material Witness Certificates, the Supervising Judge noted the power to compel witnesses from
outside the state was predicated upon his ruling that the SPGJ was criminal. See, e.g., August 25,
2022 Ex Parte Order of the Court, Certificate of Material Witness - Mark Randall Meadows
(“Further, the authority for a special purpose grand jury to conduct a criminal investigation has
been upheld by the Supreme Court of Georgia. See State v. Lampl, 296 Ga. 892 (2015).
Accordingly, the provisions of the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without the State apply pursuant to § O.C.G.A. 24-13-92 et. seq.”). Over the course of the SPGJ
investigation, 19 orders were entered to compel witnesses to appear pursuant to § 24-13-90. This
led to a host of litigation across the country where foreign courts were forced to grapple with the
novel question of whether the Georgia SPGJ proceeding is criminal in nature such that citizens
must travel to Georgia to provide testimony before this investigative body.10
For example, one witness, Jacki Pick Deason, raised the issue in Texas, where Judge
Yeary with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals provided relevant analysis in a dissenting
opinion.11 Judge Yeary, joined by three other Texas Court of Appeals judges, reasoned that the
10
For example, see In Re Jacki L. Pick, WR-94, 066-01 (Tex. App. 2022).
11
In Re Jacki L. Pick, WR-94, 066-01 (Tex. App. 2022) (Yeary, J. dissenting). The majority
opinion did not address the applicability of the Uniform Act to the SPGJ because the subpoena at
issue was moot.
17
subpoena which sought to compel the appearance of Deason in the SPGJ was void because,
although Texas has adopted the Uniform Act, it only applies “when the proceedings to be
attended are ‘criminal’ in nature, or where they are conducted by an actual ‘grand jury.’” Id. at 3.
The Texas Court further interpreted Georgia case law, finding that the SPGJ “at least according
to present interpretations of the law from that state’s own courts, conducts only civil
investigations and may not itself present an indictment or initiate a criminal prosecution.” Id.
The statutes’ vagueness as to whether this is a criminal or civil body has similarly caused
problems for witnesses claiming sovereign immunity. Specifically, United States Senator
Lindsey Graham12 and Georgia Governor Brian Kemp both raised sovereign immunity claims in
response to their subpoenas to testify. See Ex. 11; see also August 17, 2022 Motion to Quash
Subpoena Issued to Governor Brian P. Kemp. Counsel for Governor Kemp argued that he could
not be compelled to testify before the civil SPGJ because he was protected from the subpoena by
sovereign immunity. Id. While the Supervising Judge agreed that sovereign immunity would
apply to a civil special purpose grand jury, he denied the motion and held that the SPGJ is a
criminal investigative grand jury. Ex. 10 at 5 (“Put simply, there is nothing about this special
purpose grand jury that involved or implicates civil practice.”). As explained below, see infra
Section III(B)(i), this ruling was contrary to established Georgia precedent, but the fact that the
issue was raised by multiple witnesses points to the lack of statutory clarity on the subject.
The Supervising Judge's unilateral decision to declare the SPGJ a criminal body (despite
its inability to indict and Georgia precedent to the contrary) created a litany of constitutional
12
In re Graham, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194033 (N. Dist. Ga.) (2022) (Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-
03027-LMM).
18
violations for the witnesses called before it.13 However, because the statutes are devoid of any
language that may guide a court in interpreting its meaning, its use, and its application to real-life
proceedings, such a determination is arbitrary. The statutes are so vague that they lack the
“objective standards and guidelines to meet the requirement of due process.” Jekyll Isle, 256 Ga.
at 153. This double-bind cannot stand, as the distinction between criminal and civil has pertinent
implications on the permissible testimony and evidence which may come before this, and any
other, SPGJ body.
ii. The Statutes are Vague as to the Contents and Release of the Report(s).
Pursuant to a majority vote of the Fulton County Superior Court bench, the SPGJ was
dissolved on January 9, 2023. Ex. 6. In the order of dissolution, the Supervising Judge,
recognizing that the next steps of this process were unclear, invited briefing from the FCDA’s
Office and the media (notably excluding any other parties including witnesses as well as targets),
and set a hearing on the issue of publication. Id. at 2. While stating the statute clearly directed
him to release the report, the Supervising Judge cited due process concerns in ultimately ruling
that only a small portion of the report should be made public.14 The parties raised issues as to
whether the report was a court record under Rule 21, whether it was a general presentment under
13
The Supervising Judge insulated himself from appellate review of this critical and otherwise-
unreviewable issue by denying a certificate of immediate review. See Ex. 10 FN 8 (“The Court
also declines to issue a certificate of immediate review of this decision because it is clear that
sovereign immunity does not apply to criminal matters. See Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770,
777 (2016) (recommending issuance of certificate of immediate review when resolution of
immunity issue is not clear).”)
14
Ex. 7 at 4 (“[T]hus, facially, the final report should be published in toto pursuant to O.C.G.A §
15-12-80.”); Id. at 5 (“[T]he consequence of these due process deficiencies is not that the special
purpose grand jury’s final report is forever suppressed or that its recommendation for or against
indictment are in any way flawed or suspect. Rather, the consequence is that those
recommendations are for the District Attorney’s eyes only – for now. Fundamental fairness
requires this[.]”).
19
O.C.G.A. § 15-12-80, and whether a balancing test is required when rendering a decision
regarding publication based upon the due process rights of the named individuals. Id.; see also,
Ex. 3. Unfortunately, the issue of publicly releasing the special grand jury’s final report was also
not contemplated by the statute. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 et. seq. Now, posed with such a question,
the Supervising Judge was left to make his own decisions, create his own standards and, thus,
carve out an entirely unique scope of the SPGJ which may or may not have been originally
intended by the Georgia legislature.
Upon further analysis, the special purpose grand jury statutes fail to address any aspect of
the report; they are completely silent other than to say the Supervising Judge “shall require
periodic reports of the special grand jury's progress as well as a final report.” O.C.G.A. § 15-12-
101(a). The statutes do not specify whether the reports should be oral or written, nor do they
prescribe whether the reports should include substantive information such as summaries of
evidence or formal recommendations. Id. Assuming arguendo the report is to be written, the
statutes are silent as to whether the SPGJ writes the report alone or with the assistance of either
the Supervising Judge or the body requesting the investigation, here the FCDA. Id.
Relevant to the due process rights of all those who may be mentioned in the report, the
statutes are silent as to its public release. Id. It is unclear whether the report is a court record or
whether it belongs to and remains in the hands of the body that requested the investigation as the
Supervising Judge has held. Id.; see also Ex. 7. If the report is to be made public, the statutes fail
to specify who shall make that determination or how such publishing may occur, especially since
the statutes are further silent as to whether the report is considered a general presentment such
that O.C.G.A § 15-12-80 applies. Id. Finally, the statutes fail to describe how or whether those
20
individuals named in the report may be offered an opportunity to review the report or otherwise
challenge its release given the necessary implication of their due process rights. Id.
Given this lack of specificity, courts fail to interpret and apply the statutes in a uniform
manner across jurisdictions. As such, the statutes violate the principles of fundamental fairness
and are unconstitutionally vague.
B. The Statutes are Unconstitutional As Applied to This SPGJ.
The Georgia special purpose grand jury statutes have been applied to this matter through
an unconstitutional framework with little regard to the illegal consequences that resulted in
prejudicing and violating the rights of all parties impacted by the investigation. As stated above,
the Supervising Judge, along with the FCDA’s Office, has operated under the assumption that,
although baseless and contrary to established precedent, the SPGJ is a criminal investigative
body. As the SPGJ is a civil investigative body pursuant to Georgia case law, this
mischaracterization of its fundamental character resulted in a cascade of unconstitutional
consequences. For example, the SPGJ was permitted to compel the attendance and testimony of
out-of-state witnesses as well as the testimony of witnesses asserting valid claims of sovereign
immunity. Even if, as the Supervising Judge declared, this SPGJ was somehow criminal, it was
still unconstitutionally administered because the FCDA improperly and arbitrarily assigned
“target” labels, compelled those “targets” to appear, and the grand jurors drew adverse inferences
from witnesses’ Fifth Amendment assertions. In both civil and criminal interpretations, the
substantive due process rights of all parties impacted by the investigation have been violated.
The unconstitutional administration of this SPGJ violated all notions of fundamental fairness;
witnesses could not depend on the proper application of the law by the Supervising Judge, nor
could they rely on statements from the FCDA in assessing how to adequately protect their rights.
21
i. The Supervising Judge Improperly Designated the SPGJ as a Criminal Investigative
Body When Case Law Mandates it is Civil.
The only two cases in Georgia jurisprudence that touch upon the nature of a special
purpose grand jury clarify that it is a civil, not a criminal, body. See State v. Bartel, 223 Ga. App.
696 (1996); see also Kenerly v. State, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011). This issue was first raised before
the Supervising Judge when counsel for Governor Kemp argued the sovereign immunity
prevented the SPGJ from compelling his testimony. See Ex. 11; see also August 17, 2022 Motion
to Quash Subpoena Issued to Governor Brian P. Kemp. The Supervising Judge agreed that a civil
SPGJ could not compel such testimony from the Governor. Ex. 11 at 31 (“And that's your
argument that, look, this special purpose grand jury is actually a civil thing. And if you're right,
civil, I agree, sovereign immunity. I don't see any waiver anywhere.”). In denying Governor
Kemp’s Motion, the Supervising Judge ruled (for the first time in this investigation) that the
SPGJ was a criminal investigative grand jury – a ruling contrary to established Georgia
precedent. Ex. 10. This ruling created a ripple effect of constitutional violations which implicated
the due process rights of the Movant and other parties subpoenaed by this body.
In coming to this decision, the Supervising Judge drew misplaced conclusions as to the
relevant case law. Specifically, he reasoned that the special purpose grand jury in State v. Bartel,
223 Ga. App. 696 (1996), was deemed a civil investigative body because it was “convened to
conduct a civil investigation.” Ex. 10 at 4. In other words, that the stated purpose for impaneling
an investigative body determines whether it is a criminal or civil matter – not its inherent powers.
22
Id. The reasoning employed by the Supervising Judge was not derived from anything the Bartel
Court held nor can it be traced to any other case.15
Georgia precedent applies a different standard. The Georgia Court of Appeals in Kenerly
v. State, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011), interpreted Bartel as “concluding that special purpose grand
juries conduct only civil investigations.” Kenerly at 194 (citing Bartel, 223 Ga. App. at 699)
(emphasis added). Moreover, the Kenerly court relied on the stated powers of the body, rather
than the body’s purpose, as the Court did here, to interpret the boundaries of the SPGJ under the
relevant statutes.16 Kenerly, 311 Ga. App. at 194 (finding that a special purpose grand jury does
not have the power to indict: “[B]ecause the powers and duties of a special grand jury are
specifically provided for, the powers granted to regular grand juries, including the power to
indict, do not apply.”).
Counsel for Governor Kemp correctly argued that, “Bartel held that special purpose
grand juries conduct only civil investigations.” See Ex. 11; see also August 17, 2022 Motion to
Quash Subpoena Issued to Governor Brian P. Kemp. In his Order denying their Motion, the
Supervising Judge never addressed the fact that counsel’s argument was a direct quote from
binding Georgia precedent but, instead, stated counsel’s “claim” was “unfounded.” Ex. 10 FN 4.
The Supervising Judge did not just fail to distinguish the Kenerly case - he completely refused to
15
In Bartel, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the oath required for witnesses testifying
before a criminal grand jury was “irrelevant” in a civil grand jury proceeding. It was unclear
whether the grand jury was impaneled pursuant to the special purpose grand jury statute, the
grand jury statutes relating to civil investigations, or both, but the Court held that the result
would be the same because they are all civil investigations. The Court noted that it defies logic to
require the oath applicable for criminal grand juries to be administered in civil investigations
where “there obviously is not and cannot be ‘any indictment or special presentment’ or any
individual charged with a particular criminal offense.”
16
See also In re Gwinnett County Grand Jury, 284 Ga. 510, 512 (2008) (distinguishing between
the “criminal accusatory and civil investigative roles” of grand juries).
23
acknowledge or address it. Ex. 10. While utterly ignoring binding precedent, the Supervising
Judge then denied appellate review despite the fact that his ruling affected the constitutional
integrity of the investigation moving forward. Ex. 10 FN 8 (“The Court also declines to issue a
certificate of immediate review of this decision because it is clear that sovereign immunity does
not apply to criminal matters. See Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 777 (2016)
(recommending issuance of certificate of immediate review when resolution of immunity issue is
not clear).”).
As stated previously, the Supervising Judge concluded the SPGJ was criminal because it
was impaneled to investigate whether certain activity constituted a crime under Georgia law. Ex.
10. In so doing, he ignored the fact that most special purpose grand juries are impaneled to do
just that – investigate certain questionable activity, oftentimes public malfeasance, where it is
unclear on its face whether the activity is criminal.17 If there was such a thing as a criminal
special purpose grand jury, the Court of Appeals would have said so in Kenerly. Kenerly, 311
Ga. App. 190. Instead, it affirmed that special purpose grand jury investigations into possible
criminal activity are still civil in nature. Id. at 194. The Kenerly special purpose grand jury was
impaneled for the purpose of investigating suspected criminal activity surrounding the
acquisition of real property at fraudulently inflated prices, and Gwinnett County Commissioner,
Kevin Kenerly, was subsequently criminally indicted for his role in those deals.18 In affirming
17
See infra FN 6.
18
Special grand jury to look at Gwinnett land purchases, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
(Sep. 25, 2009), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/special-grand-jury-look-gwinnett-land-
purchases/Yf5VPyqKTWSsFBMOUVsdWM/ (District Attorney Danny Porter stated: “I think
the grand jury, as a group of citizens, needs to look at these expenditures of county money and
try to determine if there’s anything criminal…If there is, it needs to be prosecuted.”);
Grand jury on Gwinnett land to wrap up work, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Oct. 4,
2010), https://accesswdun.com/print/2010/10/232745 (investigating allegation that county
24
the civil nature of that grand jury proceeding, the Kenerly Court implicitly rejected the notion
that a special purpose grand jury is criminal if investigating potential criminal activity.19 Yet, this
was the sole basis cited by the Supervising Judge in declaring this SPGJ to be criminal. Ex. 10.
In fact, Kenerly is the only SPGJ case which provides substantive guidance on statutory
interpretation, and the Court of Appeals in that case thoughtfully delineated its use of “the
venerable principle of the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum” to “assume deliberate
omission of actions not listed in a statute and not otherwise addressed elsewhere.” (Emphasis
included) Kenerly, 311 Ga. App. at 193. See also Hinton v. State, 224 Ga. App. 49, 50 (1996).
The Supreme Court of Georgia and other Georgia courts have also applied this method of
statutory interpretation. See Hinton v. State, 224 Ga. App. 49, 50 (1996); Chase v. State, 285 Ga.
693, 695-96 (2009); Battallia v. City of Columbus, 199 Ga. App. 897, 898 (1991). Thus, the
Supervising Judge’s decision that the SPGJ is a criminal body is affirmatively refuted by binding
Georgia precedent. This erroneous decision had vast constitutional and procedural implications,
and the resulting taint invalidates the constitutionality and validity of the entire proceeding.
ii. The SPGJ Improperly Compelled the Appearance and Testimony of Out-of-State
Witnesses.
The Uniform Act cannot be used to compel the attendance of a witness from outside the
state in a civil proceeding as discussed above, see supra Section III(A)(i). Thus, this SPGJ
illegally compelled the attendance and testimony of numerous witnesses from outside the State
commissioner pushed the Commission to purchase property for $7m more than it was valued at
two years earlier due to his friendship with landowner).
19
Additionally, other SPGJ’s investigating potential criminal activity were filed as civil actions.
See Dekalb County Civil Case No. 13CV1024 (SPGJ investigated allegations of public
corruption within the Watershed Management Department); Cobb County Civil Case No. 05-1-
8242 (SPGJ investigated alleged bias and deception in the bidding of a computer laptop
program).
25
of Georgia. Due to the substantial number of witnesses compelled to testify under the Uniform
Act, their testimony is inexorably intertwined with the conclusions of the SPGJ, and there is no
way to extricate the taint that this improperly compelled testimony caused.
In addition to improperly compelling testimony from out-of-state witnesses, the SPGJ
improperly compelled testimony from Governor Kemp despite his valid assertion of sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity is a constitutional doctrine. Ga. Const. art. I § 2, Para. IX(e). As
explained, see supra Section III(A)(1), the doctrine of sovereign immunity was overcome by the
Judge’s decision to classify the SPGJ as a criminal investigative body in contradiction to binding
Georgia precedent.
In declaring this was a criminal SPGJ, the Supervising Judge improperly and
unconstitutionally imbued the SPGJ with powers it did not, in fact, have. The testimony illegally
obtained by the SPGJ violates notions of fundamental fairness and the due process rights of
Movant as well as other parties investigated by the SPGJ. This pervasive taint which
impermissibly corrupted the investigation can only be remedied by quashing the report and
precluding the use of all illegally obtained evidence.
C. The Statutes Were Unconstitutionally Applied to this SPGJ if Classified as

Criminal.
Even if, as the Supervising Judge concluded, the SPGJ was somehow criminal, it was still
unconstitutionally interpreted and applied. All notions of fundamental fairness were violated by
the FCDA’s arbitrary assignment of “target” statuses and the adverse inferences the SPGJ drew
from witnesses’ Fifth Amendment assertions.
26
i. The FCDA’s Arbitrary Use and Subsequent Abandonment of “Target”
Statuses Violated Principles of Fundamental Fairness.
Early on in the investigation, the FCDA sent target letters to a group of witnesses
affirmatively assigning them “target” status. Generally, a “target” is a definition given by the
Department of Justice to an individual contemplated for prosecution: “[a] ‘target’ is a person as
to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the
commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant.” See
United States Attorneys Manual (“USAM”) 9-11.151. The label of a target within the federal
criminal justice system carries with it both weight as well as presumptive rights. USAM 9-
11.150 (subpoenaing targets of grand jury investigation "may carry the appearance of
unfairness"); and USAM 9-11.154 (when target of grand recount jury investigation informs
government that they plan to invoke their fifth amendment privilege in grand jury, they should
ordinarily be excused from appearing). There is no identifiable Georgia law or any other
authority that defines a target of an investigation and what that might mean or entail within State
proceedings.
As evidenced in the public motions and subsequent hearings held before the Supervising
Judge, while the FCDA’s Office might have assigned “target” status to a number of individuals
whom they sought to subpoena, they offered no parallel rights or protections to those same
individuals as would be expected in a constitutionally-sound investigative process (as is done at
the federal level). See Ex. 12. In fact, neither the Court nor the FCDA’s Office appeared to treat
those deemed targets any differently than any other witness who was subpoenaed to testify. Id.
This raises the question of what constitutional protections a target should have in a
criminal special purpose grand jury (which has never before been addressed under Georgia law).
27
Georgia law and the Georgia Constitution prohibit the appearance before a regular grand jury of
a witness named in a proposed charging instrument. See State v. Lampl, 296 Ga. 892 (2015)
(grand juries are prohibited from compelling the appearance of a witness who has been accused
in a returned or proposed charging document at the time they are called to testify); State v.
Butler, 177 Ga. App. 594 (1986) (holding that while it violates the Fifth Amendment to call a
witness to testify to the grand jury which is considering an indictment against the witness, such
was not the case here where defendant was called to testify to an alleged crime committed by her
husband); Jenkins v. State, 65 Ga. App. 16 (1941) (grand jury had no lawful right to call the
accused before it while considering a bill of indictment against him); O.C.G.A § 24-5-506.
A criminal SPGJ (as created here by the Supervising Judge) tasked with investigating
criminal conduct and drafting a report recommending criminal indictment creates unique
problems in this context relative to the Fifth Amendment, Ga. Con. Art. I, § I, para. xvi and
O.C.G.A § 24-5-506. The SPGJ cannot return an indictment or even consider a proposed
charging instrument, so a strict reading of the case law would allow the SPGJ to compel any
witness to appear and provide testimony that could then be used in a subsequent grand jury
proceeding considering a charging instrument naming that witness (even though that same
testimony could not be compelled live before the regular grand jury). This circumvents the Fifth
Amendment, Ga. Con. Art. I, § I, para. xvi, and O.C.G.A § 24-5-506 and would permit the use of
a special purpose grand jury to obtain and present testimony which would otherwise be
unavailable to and unable to be brought before a regular criminal grand jury.
Not only were purported “targets” not given any protections, but they also appear to have
been assigned their “target” status on an arbitrary basis. The target notifications were publicly
released in July of 2022, and the practice of labeling individuals as targets appeared to be
28
abandoned by the FCDA’s Office soon thereafter. This shift coincided with the Supervising
Judge expressing his own concerns about the use of this terminology.20 See Ex. 12. During the
disqualification hearing, the Supervising Judge pointed out the lack of meaning given to “target”
status within State proceedings. Id. at 12 (“I don’t think the word target is as magical in State
proceedings as it is in Federal proceedings…”). Notably, he also warned the FCDA, “you may
want to think through in the future labeling someone that and then hailing them in because of
how this has played out.” Id. at 13. Following those comments from the Supervising Judge, no
other “targets” were publicly named.
This inconsistency is more than an inconvenience for those who had to make important
decisions (both personally and upon advice of counsel) about how to conduct themselves in the
public sphere as well as what key constitutional decisions needed to be made regarding the
ability to answer questions while under oath. Whether an individual is labeled a target is often
the ultimate question for both counsel and the client in deciding how best to defend themselves.
The fact that the FCDA’s Office chose to label some potential witnesses “targets” (which they
certainly could have chosen not to do) but then chose not to label others as such, begs the
question: are those “others” by this purposeful omission, “not targets”? If that answer is no: the
only logical conclusion is that the target labels were arbitrarily given, and no witnesses called
thereafter could rely on the legitimacy of their “witness” status.
20
In his Order disqualifying the FCDA, the Supervising Judge stated: “The designation,
borrowed from federal criminal practice, is a bit confusing in the context of this grand jury,
which has no power to bring criminal charges against anyone. It is nonetheless A potent
investigative signal that the District Attorney views Senator Jones (and the other alternate
electors) as persons more closely connected to the alleged electoral improprieties than other
witnesses who have come before the grand jury or who may yet do so.” Ex. 4 at FN 6.
29
When witnesses appeared before the SPGJ pursuant to a subpoena and had not been
given a target notification (while knowing such labels were already given to others), they made
conscious decisions regarding their ability to testify based on that reliance. Either the FCDA’s
Office must admit that they unconstitutionally assigned target labels to some witnesses while
failing to notify others or they must admit their use of target labels was misapplied and arbitrary.
To either end, this substantial failure violates all notions of fundamental fairness and due process
because no witness called to testify could depend on the designation given by FCDA’s Office
and were forced to make blind decisions in asserting constitutional privileges. Since the practice
of naming “targets” began and ended in the early stages of the investigation (with the first round
of Material Witness Certificates), the majority of the testimony heard by this SPGJ suffered from
the cancerous and arbitrary application of this otherwise meaningful title with attendant rights.
ii. Jurors Improperly Drew Adverse Inferences from Witnesses’ Invocation of

the Fifth Amendment.
In a criminal matter, jurors cannot draw negative inferences when a witness asserts his
rights under the Fifth Amendment. Barnes v. State, 335 Ga. App. 709 (2016). But here, as
discussed further in Section V, the special purpose grand jurors plainly did so.21 See Ex. 8.
Further, the grand jurors formed opinions about certain witnesses’ credibility based on whether
or not a witness took a few moments to consider the question versus quickly asserting privilege.
See infra Section V. From the foreperson’s comments, it appears the grand jurors were not
properly instructed on this important constitutional safeguard. As recently revealed, the unnamed
jurors shared a completely inaccurate and impermissible understanding of Fifth Amendment
21
“The scratching of pens on paper could be heard as jurors tallied how many times the person
invoked the Fifth Amendment.” Ex. 8 at No. 1.
30
rights. Ex. 8 at No. 10. The jurors attributed this failed understanding to the explanation provided
to them by the FCDA’s office. Id. Moreover, if one or more of the special purpose grand jurors
watched the hearing online, they would have heard the Supervising Judge say, “but if they did
nothing wrong, why aren’t they talking to the grand jury?” Ex. 12 at 27.
Thus, even if the SPGJ was somehow criminal, the SPGJ proceeding was
unconstitutionally administered. It violated the rights of impacted parties by arbitrarily assigning
“target” status while not providing adequate protections for those individuals. Furthermore,
grand jurors improperly drew adverse inferences from witnesses’ invocation of the Fifth
Amendment and relied upon those inferences in forming their conclusions. Given the pervasive
and inextricable taint which ensued from this unconstitutional application, the report must be
quashed and all evidence compelled by this SPGJ must be suppressed.
IV. THE FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE MUST BE

DISQUALIFIED.
The FCDA’s Office must be recused, disqualified, and prevented from any further
investigation or prosecution of this matter. The Supervising Judge has already held that the
FCDA’s Office has an actual, disqualifying conflict in this investigation. Ex. 4. Inexplicably,
however, the Supervising Judge refused to disqualify the FCDA from the investigation. Instead,
without any supporting authority, the Supervising Judge removed the now Lieutenant Governor
of Georgia, Burt Jones, from the investigation and prohibited any future action against him by
the FCDA. Id.
The FCDA’s Office has maintained significant power and control over the SPGJ. It was
the FCDA’s Office who made the request to impanel the SPGJ and determined the scope of the
investigation, it decided who to subpoena to testify, and what evidence to compel. Ex. 7. As the
31
Supervising Judge noted in his order regarding publication, the structure of this investigation has
been “imbalanced, incomplete, and one-sided.” Id. at 5.
Given the national attention, gravity and positions of many of the individuals involved, it
is even more imperative that the FCDA’s Office remain unattached and impartial, as is required
of all prosecutors. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (the prosecutor is “a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.”); see also Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 803
(1987); Lux v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 561, 568 (1997). After all, “[t]he prosecutor has
more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.” Robert H.
Jackson, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., The Federal Prosecutor, Address to the Second Annual
Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940).
Georgia law delineates two distinct grounds for disqualification of a prosecuting attorney.
First, a prosecutor must be disqualified when a conflict of interest exists - when the prosecutor
has a personal interest or stake in the defendant’s conviction. See Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305,
315 (1988). Such a conflict may be either actual or perceived. See Young, 481 U.S. at 787.
Second, a prosecutor can be removed on grounds of “forensic misconduct,” which commonly
arises from “improper expression by the prosecuting attorney of his [or her] personal belief in the
defendant’s guilt.” Williams, 258 Ga. at 315 (citing Vermont v. Hohman, 420 A2d 852 (Vt.
1980)).
In this matter, the FCDA’s Office has both an actual and perceived conflict of interest.
The Supervising Judge previously found that an actual conflict exists prohibiting the FCDA’s
Office from investigating Lieutenant Governor Burt Jones but erred in failing to disqualify the
32
FCDA’s Office from the entirety of the investigation as the law demands. Additionally, the scope
of the FCDA’s disqualifying conduct extends beyond the actual conflict already found by the
Supervising Judge. The FCDA’s Office, by and through the elected FCDA, exacerbated the
already existing conflict by making extrajudicial statements throughout the entirety of this
investigation which violate prosecutorial standards, constitute forensic misconduct and create an
untenable appearance of impropriety. For all of the reasons below, the FCDA and the entirety of
the FCDA’s Office must be disqualified from any further investigation or potential prosecution
of this matter.
A. The Supervising Judge Should Have Disqualified the FCDA from the Entire
Investigation Rather than Just a Witness.
On July 25, 2022, the Supervising Judge ordered the disqualification of the FCDA’s
Office from any further investigation and/or prosecution of Lieutenant Governor Burt Jones due
to an “actual and untenable” conflict. Ex. 4 at 4. By entering an order of disqualification of the
FCDA’s Office as to Lt. Governor Jones, the Supervising Judge recognized what Georgia law
clearly prescribes - that a prosecutor can be removed from a matter for which a legal conflict
exists at any stage in the proceedings, including the investigative stage. The Supreme Court of
Georgia recognizes that “‘a Georgia district attorney is of counsel in all criminal cases or matters
pending in his circuit. This includes the investigatory stages of matters preparatory to seeking an
indictment as well as the pendency of the case.” McLaughlin v. Payne, 295 Ga. 609 (2014)
quoting King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 389 (1980). The Supervising Judge was correct in
determining that disqualification was appropriate for the FCDA’s Office as it related to both the
SPGJ as well as any potential future proceedings such as seeking an indictment or going to trial.
33
The Supervising Judge was incorrect, however, because the FCDA’s conflict extends to the
entire investigation - not just one witness.
The SPGJ was impaneled for the purpose of investigating “the facts and circumstances
relating directly or indirectly to possible attempts to disrupt the lawful administration of the 2020
elections in the State of Georgia.” Ex. 1. Thus, the FCDA and her office were tasked with a
singular purpose. However, pursuant to the Supervising Judge’s reasoning in his Disqualification
Order, the investigation itself may continue – only with Lt. Governor Jones removed.
Accordingly, if charges are lodged against a group of people, particularly in a multi-defendant
prosecution, Lt. Gov. Jones will have effectively been preemptively severed out of that
prosecution. Prosecutorial disqualification does not apply in such a haphazard or disjointed
manner. Rather, when a district attorney is disqualified from a prosecution, as she was here, she
must be disqualified from the entire prosecution. In those instances, the case remains a singular
unit and the conflicted district attorney is excised; it is improper for a court to fragment an
investigation or prosecution by carving out a target or defendant while permitting the conflicted
district attorney to remain, and for good reason. The parade of unforeseen consequences to the
parties remaining in the investigation, as well as the need for the public to have confidence in the
judicial process, requires the removal of the conflicted district attorney from the investigation
and all other proceedings. To do otherwise would, among other things, permit the district
attorney to weaponize these conflicts against the other parties remaining in the proceeding.
The United States Supreme Court in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. et.
Al, 481 U.S. 787 (1987), recognized that the existence of an actual conflict cannot be limited to
the investigation or prosecution of one individual but is a conflict that permeates the entire
proceeding.
34
Once we have drawn that conclusion [that a conflict exists], however, we have deemed
the prosecutor subject to influences that undermine confidence that a prosecution can be
conducted in a disinterested fashion. If this is the case, we cannot have confidence in a
proceeding in which this officer plays the critical role of preparing and presenting the
case...”
Id. at 811. (Emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court made clear in Young that the remedy for an actual conflict
could not be made piecemeal, as the Supervising Judge improperly chose to do here:
Appointment of an interested prosecutor is also an error whose effects are pervasive.

Such an appointment calls into question, and therefore requires scrutiny of, the conduct
of an entire prosecution, rather than simply a discrete prosecutorial decision. Determining
the effect of this appointment thus would be extremely difficult. A prosecution contains a
myriad of occasions for the exercise of discretion, each of which goes to shape the record
in a case, but few of which are part of the record.
Id. at 811.
Lastly, the Court in Young emphasized that allowing a matter to continue where a conflicted
prosecutor remained constitutes clear error.
Furthermore, appointment of an interested prosecutor creates an appearance of

impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general.
The narrow focus of harmless-error analysis is not sensitive to this underlying concern. If
a prosecutor uses the expansive prosecutorial powers to gather information for private
purposes, the prosecution function has been seriously abused even if, in the process,
sufficient evidence is obtained to convict a defendant. Prosecutors "have available a
terrible array of coercive methods to obtain information," such as "police investigation
and interrogation, warrants, informers and agents whose activities are immunized,
authorized wiretapping, civil investigatory demands, [and] enhanced subpoena power."
The misuse of those methods "would unfairly harass citizens, give unfair advantage to
[the prosecutor's personal interests], and impair public willingness to accept the
legitimate use of those powers."
Id. at 811 (quoting C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 460 (1986)(emphasis added). The
Supreme Court added that:
Public confidence in the disinterested conduct of that official is essential. Harmless-error

analysis is not equal to the task of assuring that confidence. It is best suited for the review
35
of discrete exercises of judgment by lower courts, where information is available that
makes it possible to gauge the effect of a decision on the trial as a whole. In this case,
however, we establish a categorical rule against the appointment of an interested
prosecutor, adherence to which requires no subtle calculations of judgment. Given the
fundamental and pervasive effects of such an appointment, we therefore hold that
harmless-error analysis is inappropriate in reviewing the appointment of an interested
prosecutor in a case such as this.
Id. at 814 (citing United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 432 (1983)
(prosecutorial use of grand jury to elicit evidence for use in civil case "improper per se")
(emphasis added).
In applying the clear standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court to the actual conflict
which exists in this proceeding, it cannot be understated how important this issue is, especially in
an investigation of this magnitude. The rights of President Trump, as well as all others impacted
by this investigation, are now subject to the prosecutorial discretion and decision-making of a
prosecuting body that even the Supervising Judge acknowledged has an actual, disqualifying
conflict. This is simply untenable. For this reason alone, the FCDA’s Office must be removed
from any further investigation or prosecution of this matter.
B. The FCDA’s Public Statements Violate Prosecutorial Standards, Constitute

Forensic Misconduct, and Create the Appearance of Impropriety Requiring
Disqualification.
The FCDA’s conflict has been amplified and exacerbated by the FCDA’s extrajudicial
statements which violate prosecutorial standards and constitute forensic misconduct, further
necessitating disqualification. The Georgia Supreme Court has recognized that pretrial publicity
poses a serious concern. See Strong v. State, 246 Ga. 612, 613 (1980) (citing United States v.
Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
36
A prosecutor is the administrator of justice who should exercise sound discretion and
independent judgment in serving the public interest and must act with integrity while avoiding
the appearance of impropriety. See ABA Standard 3-1.2. Prosecutors must be circumspect and
not make comments that have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal
proceeding or that heighten the public condemnation of the accused, and they should limit
comments to what is necessary to inform the public of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a
legitimate law enforcement purpose. See ABA Standard 3-1.4; ABA Standard 3-1.10(c); see also
Georgia Rule 3.8(g) (emphasis added). Furthermore, prosecutors should not allow improper
considerations, such as partisan, political or personal considerations, to effect prosecutorial
discretion, nor can their judgment be influenced by a personal interest in potential media
attention. ABA Standard 3-1.6(a); ABA Standard 3-1.10(h).
Courts have previously looked at violations of the rules of professional conduct in
evaluating whether a prosecutorial conflict exists, and these considerations form the foundation
of much of the law on disqualification.22 When comments go so far as to address the guilt of the
accused, they constitute forensic misconduct thereby requiring disqualification under Georgia
law. See Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305 (1988) (“improper expression by the prosecuting
attorney of his [or her] personal belief in the defendant’s guilt”) (citing Vermont v. Hohman and
In re J.S., 140 Vt. 230 (1981).
i. The FCDA’s Statements to the Press Violate Prosecutorial Standards and

Constitute Forensic Misconduct.
Since the inception of this investigation, the FCDA has spoken nearly forty times with at
least fourteen different media outlets about this matter. Ex. 5. Even the Supervising Judge noted
22
See generally Ventura v. State, 346 Ga. App. 309 (2018); Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton Et Fils S.A. et. Al, 481 U.S. 787 (1987); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
37
the FCDA’s very public approach, which he described as being “on national media almost
nightly talking about the investigation.” Ex. 12 at 47. With each new development in the
investigation, the FCDA repeatedly made public statements within days of each other in print
articles, press conferences and videotaped interviews, and even live on prime-time national
television. Ex. 5. Following each round of interviews, outside media sources repeated her
comments, and a wave of additional coverage ensued across various networks for days to come.
The FCDA regularly expressed her personal opinions about the criminality of the acts under
investigation thereby suggesting the guilt of those who may be accused and has criticized the
exercise of constitutional rights of witnesses contrary to the prosecutorial obligations of the
FCDA’s office.23 Id.
When the investigation first began in February 2021, the FCDA sat down for a prime
time interview on MSNBC and opined about President Trump’s mens rea during the call with
Secretary of State Raffensperger.24 Similar interviews continued throughout the investigation. Id.
The statements served no legitimate law enforcement purpose and heightened the public
condemnation of the witnesses and those contemplated by the scope of this investigation. See Ex.
5.
23
In re J.S., 140 Vt. 230 (1981) (“it is unconscionable for a prosecutor representing the people…
to undermine the rights specifically guaranteed in the Constitution he has taken an oath to
uphold.”)
24
“When any prosecutor throughout this country is interviewing people trying to determine if a
crime was committed, and if they understood what they were doing, the mens rea is always
important. So you look at facts to see, ‘did they really have intent?’ [or] ‘did they really
understand what they were doing?’ Detailed facts become important like, asking for a specific
number and then going back to investigate and understand that that number is just one more than
the number that is needed. It lets you know that someone had a clear mind. They understood
what they were doing, and so when you are pursuing the investigation, facts like that that may
not seem so important, become very important.” Ex. 5 at No. 4.
38
Only days before the grand jurors would be charged with investigating whether the
activity under investigation rose to that of a crime, the FCDA publicly and explicitly stated the
conduct under investigation was in fact criminal.25 Even after the grand jury was impaneled, the
FCDA continued making public statements that the activities to be reviewed by the newly
constituted SPGJ were illegal.26 Most concerning, in September of 2022, while the SPGJ was in
the middle of their investigation and (we now know, see infra Section V) were permitted to
consume media coverage, the FCDA commented that “credible allegations of serious crimes”
existed and “people are facing prison sentences.” Id. at No. 37. In each such statement, the
FCDA commented on the ultimate issue the grand jury was impaneled to decide. Given the
SPGJ’s daily consumption of the news media, the FCDA’s comments created a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing the SPGJ’s decision. The FCDA’s expression of her personal
opinions of the criminality of the conduct and the guilt of those being investigated rose to the
level of forensic misconduct which creates an actual conflict requiring disqualification. See
Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305 (1988).
ii. The FCDA’s Online Activity Violates Prosecutorial Standards and Creates the
Appearance of Impropriety.
In its order disqualifying the FCDA, the Supervising Judge noted: “[a]n investigation of
this significance, garnering the public attention it necessarily does and touching so many political
25
“So in this case, you have an allegation of a human being, of a person, of an American citizen,
possibly doing something that would’ve infringed upon the rights of lots of Georgians.
Specifically from my county—Fulton County—right to vote being infringed upon. And the
allegations, quite frankly, were not a civil wrongdoing, but a crime.” Ex. 5 at No. 22.
26
“…and two, that if we live in a free land in a democracy, we have to have free and fair
elections. And so, I am very concerned that if behavior that is illegal goes unchecked, that it
could lead to a very bad start and a very, very bad path….[While discussing the electors] There
are so many issues that could have come about if somebody participates in submitting a
document that they know is false. You can’t do that.” Ex. 5 No. 24.
39
nerves in our society, cannot be burdened by legitimate doubts about the District Attorney’s
Motives.” Ex. 4 at 5. He concluded, “[t]he District Attorney does not have to be apolitical - but
her investigations do.” Id. Further, the Supervising Judge held, “the fact that concern about the
District Attorney’s partiality naturally, immediately, and reasonably arises in the minds of the
public, the pundits, and – most critically – the subjects of the investigation” is what necessitates
disqualification. Id. Courts have an interest in ensuring that “legal proceedings appear fair to all
who observe them.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988). A concern for actual
prejudice misses the point, for what is at stake is the public perception of the integrity of our
criminal justice system. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. et. Al, 481 U.S. 787,
812 (1987).
"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice," and a prosecutor with conflicting
loyalties presents the appearance of precisely the opposite. Society's interest in
disinterested prosecution therefore would not be adequately protected by harmless-error
analysis, for such analysis would not be sensitive to the fundamental nature of the error
committed.
Id. at 812 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 346 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation stands
the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full machinery of the state
in scrutinizing any given individual. Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced
immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of
everyday life. For this reason, we must have assurance that those who would wield this
power will be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of
justice.
Id. at 814.
A court must consider how the facts would appear to a well-informed, thoughtful and objective
observer, U.S. v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995), and courts should “resolve all doubts
in favor of disqualification.” United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 273 (4th Cir. 1977).
40
The FCDA’s social media activity during the investigation creates the appearance of
impropriety. In July 2022, after subpoenaing a slew of high-profile witnesses, she used her
campaign Twitter account to promote a biased political cartoon depicting the FCDA fishing a
recently subpoenaed witness out of a swamp. 27 Posting a political cartoon depicting the
influencing of witnesses in an “investigation of this significance, garnering the public attention it
necessarily does and touching so many political nerves in our society,” does not create the
appearance of an unbiased and “apolitical” investigation.
Furthermore, the FCDA promoted her own campaign on the shoulders of partisan support
for this SPGJ investigation.28 Within a couple of days, the FCDA’s Twitter account increased by
27
On July 18, 2022, the FCDA posted the cartoon depicting her fishing Lyndsey Graham out of
a swamp and President Trump stating, “I know you’ll do the right thing for the swamp,
Lyndsey.” The timing of this post is particularly relevant because, less than two weeks prior, the
SPGJ subpoenaed Lyndsey Graham to testify, and based on the foreperson’s statements, see
supra Section V, the grand jurors were aware of Senator Graham’s challenges to that subpoena.
28
On July 11, 2022, political strategist Adam Parkhomenko tweeted multiple times asking for 1)
users to follow the FCDA’s twitter account, 2) donations to the FCDA’s campaign, and 3) one-
thousand retweets of his requests stating, “I can’t think of a better way to celebrate after Lyndsey
Graham lost in court today then support the person who is holding them all accountable.” The
FCDA personally replied thanking him for his support on July 14, 2022 and her tweet was liked
by close to twenty-two thousand followers and retweeted over eight-thousand times. On July 15,
2022, while continuing to solicit followers, Adam again tied his request to this investigation by
posting a Yahoo! News article related to the target letters sent out that day. The next day, in a
series of tweets, while noting the FCDA now had fifty-thousand new followers, he again tweeted
41
approximately one-hundred thousand followers, and requests for campaign donations were
retweeted thousands of times. On at least three occasions, the FCDA personally inserted herself
into this Twitter campaign for “followers, tweets and donations” which specifically referenced
this investigation; it is that personal involvement and interest which creates the disqualifying
conflict. The FCDA’s posts do not further a legitimate law enforcement purpose but instead
portray a biased prosecutor with a personal interest.
While these posts, if standing alone, might not be sufficient for disqualification, they
must be considered in combination with the facts giving rise to the disqualifying conflict
previously found to exist. The Supervising Judge called the FCDA’s behavior in campaigning for
the political opponent of a named target a “what were you thinking moment” resulting in
“horrible optics” and “problematic” from a disqualification perspective. Ex. 12 at 46. Those
sentiments apply equally to the FCDA’s social media posts which cannot be considered in a
vacuum. The cumulative impact of the FCDA’s public behavior casts a shadow of bias over her
office and the entire investigation as it touches upon the same concerns referenced by the
Supervising Judge. Id. (noting the need for the public to believe a “fair and balanced approach”
was taken in this “non-partisan” investigation driven only by the facts and following the
evidence wherever it leads.”). The FCDA’s behavior does not paint the picture of an open-
minded, uninterested prosecutor fairly seeking justice on behalf of the public. Therefore, in
asking for campaign donations, retweets and followers, this time stating, “her account has
increased by 50k followers this week. She subpoenaed Lindsey Graham. Let’s help build her
platform...” On July 17, 2022, as her followers climbed to eighty-six thousand, he tweeted two
additional times asking for more followers. The FCDA again retweeted publicly thanking Adam
for his support, and her tweet was retweeted over twenty-five hundred times and liked by over
fourteen-thousand followers. She then retweeted his original July 11, 2022 post thereby
personally soliciting followers, retweets and campaign donations on the back of his requests
which specifically referenced this investigation. Ex. 5 at 8-10.
42
addition to the actual conflict previously found to exist and the conflict created through forensic
misconduct, this appearance of impropriety likewise creates a conflict. The totality of the
circumstances demands disqualification.
V. THE PUBLIC COMMENTS MADE BY THE FOREPERSON AND GRAND

JURORS REVEAL THAT THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDING WAS TAINTED
BY IMPROPER INFLUENCES, INCOMPLETE OR INACCURATE
INSTRUCTIONS, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFERENCES.
On February 13, 2023, the Supervising Judge ordered the release of a redacted version of
the final report as a means of protecting the due process rights of individuals who may be named
in such report. Ex. 7. The Court referred to the SPGJ process as a “one-sided exploration,” where
lawyers were not allowed to be present, potential future defendants were not allowed to present
evidence in their defense, and, in the words of the court “there was very limited due process in
this process for those who might now be named as indictment-worthy in the final report.” Id. at
5. The process was “imbalanced, incomplete, and one-sided.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, the
Supervising Judge felt that fundamental fairness required the severe redaction of the report upon
its release to the public.
On February 21, 2023, five days after the Supervising Judge consciously decided to
release only a limited, redacted version of the SPGJ’s report, the foreperson of the SPGJ decided
to speak with the media – first, in an interview with the Associated Press, then with the New
York Times, and then the Atlanta Journal Constitution. Ex. 8. The foreperson then sat for a 42-
minute interview with NBC’s Blayne Alexander and was subsequently interviewed live on-air by
CNN’s Kate Bouldan that evening. Id. The foreperson’s now widespread statements have
provided a first-hand glimpse inside the SPGJ process – an otherwise historically secretive affair.
Additionally, on March 15, 2023, five special purpose grand jurors spoke anonymously to the
43
Atlanta Journal Constitution. Id. at No. 11. Collectively, the six jurors’ statements reveal a
tainted process incapable of producing valuable evidentiary material and a District Attorney’s
Office who provided constitutionally flawed instructions.
In Georgia, the rules directed to grand jurors as they relate to grand jury secrecy are
relatively permissive compared to other jurisdictions. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-67(b). The only
limitation placed on grand jurors is that juror deliberations must remain confidential. See In re
Gwinnett County Grand Jury, 284 Ga. 510, 512 (2008). Members of the grand jury are sworn to
“keep the deliberations of the grand jury secret unless called upon to give evidence thereof in
some sort of court of law of this state.” Id.; O.C.G.A. § 15-12-67(b). It is difficult to take a
scalpel to the work of grand juries and parse out what does or does not constitute deliberations,
but the foreperson seemingly breached that obligation in her public appearances. The foreperson
disclosed grand jurors’ opinions as to the credibility of witnesses,29 their strategic decisions in
drafting the report,30 and general discussions between the jurors.31 She ultimately revealed that
the SPGJ recommended at least twelve people for indictment. Ex. 8 at No. 4. That
recommendation is, of course, the product of deliberations. In fact, the FCDA’s Office would
agree, as stated by Assistant District Attorney Wakeford: “The report is the necessary result of
the deliberations of the grand jury.” Ex. 3 at 38.
The collective grand juror interviews also revealed the many outside influences on the
SPGJ during the eight months of their investigation. Specifically, the foreperson revealed that the
29
Witnesses were “honest,” “forthcoming,” “not very willing to speak,” and “genuine.” Ex. 8.
30
The foreperson stated the perjury section “ended up included there because it was less pointed
of a suggestion” than the recommendations made elsewhere in the report. Ex. 8 at No. 4.
31
“We definitely talked about the alternate electors a fair amount, they were absolutely part of the
discussion….We talked a lot about December and things that happened in the Georgia
legislature.” Ex. 8 at No. 2.
44
FCDA’s Office explicitly told the grand jurors that they were allowed to consume news coverage
related to the investigation during the time period they conducted it. Id. at No. 1. Not only was
the SPGJ permitted to review news coverage, but a grand juror brought a newspaper into the
room every day and pointed out stories about the events under investigation. Id. The SPGJ’s
review of outside material must be analyzed in combination with the improper public statements
contemporaneously made by both the FCDA’s Office as well as the Supervising Judge. The
foreperson made statements indicating that the grand jurors considered the viability of litigating
legal issues outside of their purview, indicated knowledge of how witnesses responded to
questioning in other matters outside of their purview, and that they considered the resources of
the FCDA’s Office in making their decisions which, again, was outside of their purview.32 The
foreperson disclosed that the grand jury reviewed footage and testimony from the Jan. 6 hearings
and other pending litigation, as well as media interviews by certain witnesses.33 Based upon that
extraneous information, the grand jurors decided which witnesses to call (or not to call) and drew
assumptions regarding what witnesses might testify (or not testify) to.34 For example, the grand
jurors assumed, “Trump, had he been summoned would likely have invoked the Fifth
32
“At some point through this investigation, especially as we began to speak to higher profile
witnesses, I think some of the combativeness that we experienced meant that the DA’s team, as
well as us, started to pick our battles. And when someone, like for example, goes before the
January 6 Committee and says they plead the 5th 200 times, do you really expect them to come
before you and say something different?” Ex. 8 at No. 5.
33
“…The lawyers would show video of the person appearing on television or testifying before
the U.S. House committee that investigated the Jan. 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol, periodically
asking the witness to confirm certain things.” Ex. 8 at No. 1.
34
“We kind of knew what to expect, and so especially with our time being limited and with our
resources being limited, when it came to that it was like “eh, we’d rather get this person, which is
a battle that we can win, than this other one…. I could see how getting the former president to
talk to us would have been a year in negotiation by itself…. I’d be fascinated by what he said,
but do you think he would come in and say anything groundbreaking or just the same kinda thing
we’ve heard? So, at some point you don’t need to hear 50 people say the same thing.” Ex. 8 at
Nos. 1, 5.
45
Amendment, which he reportedly did more than 400 times when he sat for a deposition last
summer with the New York Attorney General’s office.” Ex. 8 at No. 11.
Most concerning, the grand jurors spoke about the inferences which they drew from
witnesses’ invocations of the Fifth Amendment.35 The foreperson described prosecutors
engaging in what she came to think of as a “show and tell” process when witnesses refused to
answer almost every question and stated, “the scratching of pens on paper could be heard as
jurors tallied how many times the person invoked the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at No. 1. Moreover,
when a witness invoked the Fifth, “a prosecutor would play videos of speeches, TV interviews or
testimony the witness had given elsewhere.” Id. at No. 11. The juror’s observation indicates the
lack of respect for the Fifth Amendment shown by the FCDA”s office: “I don’t know if it was
like cruelty, but they’re like, if you’re going to take the Fifth, we’re going to watch you.” Id. The
fact that the juror had to question whether the prosecutor was acting cruelly speaks for itself.
As a continued display of the FCDA’s failed understanding of the Fifth Amendment, the
grand jurors recalled that the FCDA’s office “repeatedly” told the grand jurors that they “should
not perceive someone invoking his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as an
admission of guilt.” In reality, a witnesses’ assertion of the Fifth Amendment has nothing to do
with guilt. As a refresher, the Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part: “No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. The
instruction given to the grand jurors, that the invocation was not an admission of guilt, was
insufficient on its face. See Barnes v. State, 335 Ga. App. 709 (2016) (precisely forbidding jurors
from drawing any inferences from a witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment). The pattern
35
She continuously says “we.” Ex. 8.
46
and practice of the FCDA’s office of forcing witnesses, after invoking the Fifth, to continue to
testify while showing videos of them from outside sources violates all notions of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.36 As stated in Barnes, “too many, even those who should be better
advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who
invoke it are guilty of a crime.”
The foreperson, armed with an improper education of the Fifth Amendment, as provided
by the FCDA, shared some specific observations in her Fifth Amendment analysis. She said of
former chief of staff Mark Meadows, “Mr. Meadows didn’t share very much at all and was not
very willing to speak on much of anything” and “I asked if he had Twitter, and he pled the
Fifth.” Id. at Nos. 6, 8. In contrast, she felt that Rudy Giuliani “genuinely seemed to consider
whether it was merited before declining to answer.” Id. at No. 1. Senator Lindsay Graham,
despite challenging his subpoena, struck her as honest, forthcoming, and very willing to have a
conversation. Id. at No. 6. Since the Supervising Judge declared this to be a criminal SPGJ, as
previously stated, it was improper for a grand juror to draw any inferences from a witness
invoking his rights under the Fifth Amendment. See Barnes, 335 Ga. App. 709 (2016). Not only
did this SPGJ arbitrarily draw inferences from witnesses’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment,
but the foreperson then reiterated those negative inferences through the megaphone of the media,
thereby tainting any future grand jury.
36
The foreperson described prosecutors, in response to witnesses invoking the Fifth, engaging in
what she came to think of as a “show and tell” process where they would show videos of that
witness, periodically asking him or her to confirm certain things, and “the scratching of pens on
paper could be heard as jurors tallied how many times the person invoked the Fifth
Amendment.” Ex. 8 at No. 1. “When people would take the Fifth over and over, we could kind
of go, ugh” one juror said. “Not because we’re like, oh my gosh you’re guilty, whatever. It was
like we’re going to be here all day.” Ex. 8 at No. 11.
47
The grand jurors’ comments reveal a grand jury that relied upon improper outside sources
and illegally drawn inferences in directing the course of their investigation and rendering their
ultimate decision. Throughout the foreperson’s media tour, and the subsequent statements of
additional grand jurors, it became apparent that this grand jury was improperly supervised or,
worse, improperly instructed from the outset. The public cannot have faith in the impartiality of
this constitutionally unsound investigation. The results of this tainted investigation included in
the final report will negatively impact the due process rights of the named individuals, and the
report must be suppressed as it violates the principles of fundamental fairness.
VI. THE SUPERVISING JUDGE VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES

IMPACTED BY THIS INVESTIGATION.
Compounding the various harms already inflicted upon the SPGJ, the Supervising Judge
made improper comments – both to the press and in court - regarding the investigation.37
Additionally, during the course of the SPGJ investigation, the Supervising Judge indicated bias
on more than one occasion by making prejudicial comments.38 More specifically, he made
improper remarks impacting the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused. As argued above, this
behavior affected the substantive rights of witnesses and non-witnesses alike, including President
Trump.
37
The supervising judge provided interviews to the Atlanta Journal Constitution, the Associated
Press, 11 Alive, CNN, Yahoo! News, and ABC News. See Ex. 9.
38
In speaking about the electors, the Supervising Judge stated, “we’re not going to get into
whether they should be surprised or not that they have become the subject of negative attention
based on the decisions they made.” Ex. 12 at 20.
48
A. The Supervising Judge Made Prejudicial Statements Regarding Witnesses’
Invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
On July 21, 2022, the Supervising Judge heard argument from counsel for the Georgia
electors who sought to quash their subpoenas. In doing so, counsel argued the electors should not
be required to appear before the SPGJ in order to assert their Fifth Amendment rights. In
response, the Supervising Judge replied, “but if they did nothing wrong, why aren’t they talking
to the grand jury?” Ex. 12 at 27. Counsel for the electors further argued that, because the
allegations against them related to signing certificates, questions about their name could
conceivably warrant a Fifth Amendment assertion. In response, the Supervising Judge stated,
“That may be something that the Grand Jury may want to know, that this person won’t even give
her name under oath. That could be instructive to what the Grand Jury is doing but they wouldn’t
know if they never met the person.” Id. at 28. His statements were made in open-court and
streamed live on YouTube to the public.39 As the Supreme Court held in Ohio v. Reiner, 532
U.S. 17, 20 (2001):
[W]e have emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment's "basic functions ... is to protect
innocent men ... 'who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.'" In
Grunewald, we recognized that truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those
of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the
speaker's own mouth.
Id. (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 421-422 (1957) (quoting
Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City, 350 U. S. 551, 557-558 (1956))
(emphasis in original).
The court may not suggest that a witness invoking their Fifth Amendment right is evidence of
guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); see also Carter v. Ky., 450 U.S. 288 (1981)
39
Judge Robert McBurney, YOUTUBE (July 25, 2022),
https://www.youtube.com/@judgerobertmcburney7938/streams
49
(“The penalty imposed upon a defendant for the exercise of his constitutional privilege not to
testify is severe when there is an adverse comment on his silence.”). Yet the Supervising Judge
publicly condemned witnesses who chose to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege, and the
comments were livestreamed to his YouTube channel for the world, including the special
purpose grand jurors and any future jurors, to see. As discussed in Section V, supra, we now
know the grand jurors were carefully watching the news as well as following the legal challenges
filed by witnesses. Ex. 7. We also know they made impermissible inferences based on the
invocation of the Fifth Amendment by various witnesses. Id.
The Supervising Judge’s improper remarks to the jurors regarding witnesses’ invocation
of the Fifth Amendment violated the rights of those witnesses as well as all parties impacted by
this investigation, including Movant. The Supervising Judge’s Fifth Amendment commentary,
combined with the FCDA’s Office’s ill-informed understanding and edification to the jurors of
the Fifth Amendment, see supra Section V, evidences a flawed process. Accordingly, any
evidence obtained by this SPGJ, in violation of the rights of witnesses and non-parties alike,
must be quashed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
VII. CONCLUSION
As it relates to this investigation, Fulton County, Georgia has become a topic of
conversation across the United States and internationally. The whole world has watched the
process of the SPGJ unfold and what they have witnessed was a process that was confusing,
flawed and, at-times, blatantly unconstitutional. Given the scrutiny and the gravity of the
investigation and those individuals involved—namely, the movant President Donald J. Trump,
this process should have been handled correctly, fairly, and with deference to the law and the
highest ethical standards. Instead, the SPGJ involved a constant lack of clarity as to the law,
50
8
9
10
Exhibit 2
FILED IN OFFICE
STATE OF GEORGIA
M AY 5 2023
@
1
"
WIN
IN RE: ) DEPUTY CL'ER'K SUPEREOR COURT
SPECIAL PURPOSE GRAND JURY ) 2022-EX-000024 FULTON COUNTY, GA
)
) Judge Robert C. I. McBurney
)
STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS
On March 20, 2023, former President Donald J. Trump filed a Motion in this matter seeking
several forms of relief. Presenting a variety of arguments, the Motionl ultimately requested that
the final report of the Fulton County Special Purpose Grand Juryz be "quashed and expunged from
the record"; that all of the evidence "derived from" the SPGJ be suppressed in any future
proceedings; and that the Fulton County District Attomey's Office3 be disqualified from "any
further investigation and/or prosecution of this matter or any related matter derived from their use
of the SPGJ." Mtn. at 51. On April 28, 2023, Cathleen A. Latham filed a Motion adopting or
joining the original Motion. Mrs. Latham's own Motion added a request for an injunction which
would quash "the SPGJ actions" in their entirety, enjoin any State entity from "presenting or
1
While two Movants have submitted Motions in this matter, this response will refer to the first,
Mr. Trump's, as "the Motion" throughout. Citations to the Motion will read as "Mtn. at [page]" or
"Mtn., Exhibit [number]." The second, filed by Mrs. Cathleen A. Latham, will be referred to as
the "Latham Motion" where applicable. Citations to the Latham Motion will read as "Latham Mtn.
at [page]." This response will refer to the two parties who have brough these Motions as "Movants"
or "the Movants" throughout. Where it is necessary to distinguish between the two Movants, this
response will refer to them by their names.
2
This response will refer to the Special Purpose Grand Jury as "SPGJ" or "the SPGJ" throughout.
3
This response will refer to the Fulton County District Attorney's Office as "FCDAO" or "the
FCDAO" throughout. Where it is necessary to discuss the District Attorney as an individual, this
response will refer to her as "the District Attorney."
utilizing any evidence or testimony derived by the SPGJ," and disqualify the FCDAO from any
further involvement in the matter. LathaIn Mtn. at 5-6. Both Motions reqUested a hearing, and also
that this matter be reassigned or transferred to another judge for their consideration. This Court
thereafter provided an order outlining a schedule for the State's response and asked that the
FCDAO specifically address whether the matter should bee heard by another judge, as well as
whether a hearing should be held.
The State now responds that the Motions should be dismissed or denied as appropriate.
The Movants-advance constitutional arguments for which they have no standing and whichfail to
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of pertinent statutes. They request that the FCDAO be
disqualified on grounds which fail to meet the exacting standards for prosecutorial disqualification
under Georgia law, and also by repeating prior unsuccessful arguments or adopting standards
.. which do not apply. They refer vaguely to violations of their own due process rights arising from
a "tainted" grand jury process without making a showing demonstrating the existence of either.
Overall, the Motions are procedurally flawed and advance arguments that lack merit, and the State
respectfully requests that this Court retain supervision of this matter and dismiss or deny the
Motions as appropriate without a hearing.
I. Because the Movants. do not provide any standard or basis for the transfer of this
matter to another judge, this Court should retain supervisiOn of this matter and
deny the Motions without a hearing.
As an initial matter, the Movants request that their Motions not be heard by this Court,
instead preferring that they be heard by either the Chief Judge or another Fulton County Superior
Court judge. The Movants do not clarify a standard for assessing the request for a transfer to
another judge, citing neither the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Superior Court Rules, nor any
statute or other provision. The Motion states only that this Court's "nexus to certain aspects of the
SPGJ and the subsequent drafting of the report, in combination with his prior rulings" require a
transfer. Mtn. at 10. The grounds for this request appear to be twofold. First, the Movants disagree
with this Court's "improper application of the law," specifically its rulings regarding the criminal
nature of the SPGJ and the disqualification of the FCDAO. Second, the Movantsargue that certain
comments made by the Court during oral argument in 2022 were imprOper. Because these
arguments lack merit, and neither establishes an appropriate basis for the transfer of this matter to
a different judge, the District Attorney respectfully asserts that there are no grounds for another
judge to hear these Motions.4
The first basis for transfer offered by the Movants is without merit because disagreement
or criticism of a judge's prior rulings does not fiirnish a litigant with a basis for having subsequent
motions heard by a different judge. The second basis provided by the Movants concerns comments
made by this Court during oral arguments made during 2022 (Mtn. at 48-5 0), but it is not clear
what impact, if any, the comments could have had upon the Movants. Certainly, these comments,
which appear to relate to witnesses' possible assertion of Fifih Amendment rights before the SPGJ,
have nothing at all to do with Mr. Trump, as they were not made about him or any aspect of SPGJ
administration that involved him. Mrs. Latham joins and ad0pts Mr. Trump's Motion but does not
clarify how any comments concerning the possible assertion of Fifih Amendment rights before the
SPGJ actually affected her. The Movants argue only that this COurt's comments could have
possibly affected the grand jurors' understanding of certain witnesses' assertion of their Fifth
Amendment rights and that, as a result, non-witnesses were also negatively affected. Mtn. at 50.
4
The Motion also criticizes this Court's denial of certificates of immediate review in two instances.
Mtn. at 10; l9 n.13; 24. Such decisions are subject to a judge's "unfettered discretion" and "carte
blanche authority." Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 1'71, 178-79 (3)(a) (2019). The Motion clarifies that the
Movants disagreed with this Court's decisions in those instances, both substantively and
procedurally, but it does notarticulate how the denials amount to judicial impropriety or why they
might support the transfer of this matter to another judge.
3
Movants refer generally to the Court's cements "violating the rights of' witnesses as well as "all
parties impacted by the investigation, including [Movants]." Id. The Motion then combines this
Court's comments with other arguments they make regarding the application of the Fifth
Amendment within the SPGJ (addressed herein in Part IV) and asserts that together these
demonstrate a "flawed process" requiring the quashal of any evidence obtained by the SPGJ "in
violation of the rights of. wimesses and non-parties alike." Id. The Movants argue the SPGJ was a
"constitutionally unsound investigation" whose impartiality cannot be trusted by the public and
whose report "will negatively impact the due process rights of the named individuals" Mtn. at 48.
This Court should deny the Movants' request on these grounds for quashal of evidence
obtained by the SPGJ. The Movants' vague and sweeping assertions of due process violations lack-
a basis in law or in fact. They provide no authority demonstrating how such comments could be
fundamentally unfair to them. This Court's comments, made .in the midst of extensive oral
argument, are too isolated and too far removed from any possible impact upon the Movants' rights.
It cannot suffice to assert that the comments might have been heard by the grand jurors, who as a
result might have altered their understanding of the. Fifth Amendment, which might in turn have
affected their evaluation of certain witnesses, and which thus might have altered or "tainted" the
report, which in turn might somehow negatively affect the Movants.
Because these arguments are far too attenuated to support any claim of a due process
violation for either Movant', this Court should deny the Movants' request for quashal as presented
in Part VI of the Motion. As a result, this Court should also deny the Movants' request that their
Motions be heard by another judge, particularly because they do not articulate any sort of standard
for this Court's evaluation of their request. Finally, this Court should also deny the MoVants'-
request for a hearing. The Movants' arguments are purely legal and do not raise any factual dispute
4
requiring resolution in a hearing. The original Motion attaches hundreds of pages of exhibits
containing statements, transcripts, and prior orders of this Court, and there is no factual matter that
will be further developed by a hearing. As will be shown below, most of the Movants' arguments
are barred by lack of standing, untimeliness, and other procedural flaws, and any remaining
arguments are without merit. There are simply no matters requiring resolution by this Court that-
require or warrant a hearing. As a result, in compliance with the instructions of this Court, the
District Attorney respectfiJlly requests that this Court deny the Movants' request for a hearing and
rule upon these Motions on the basis of the papers.
II. The statutes concerning special purpose grand juries are not unconstitutional.
The Movants argue that the statutory scheme defining and governing special purpose grand
juries is unconstitutional.5 They assert that the statutes are both unconstitutionally vague (Mtn. at
15-21) and unconstitutional as applied in this matter (Mtn. at 21-31). Because the Movants fail to
demonstrate a cognizable, individualized injury and therefore lack standing, their constitutional
challenges should be dismissed. To the extent that the Court evaluates the substance of their
challenges, the Movants' arguments fail to demonstrate either vagueness or as-applied
constitutional concerns, and their Motions should be denied.
A. Standing
The Georgia Supreme Court recently engaged in close examination of the nature of
standing under the Georgia Constitution. In so doing, the Court reaffirmed a basic and
longstanding tenet of jurisprudence: in order to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of.
a statute, a citizen must demonstrate an "individualized injury?' or "injury-infact." "We have long
held that Georgia courts may not decide the constitutionality of statutes absent an individualized
5
These statutes include o.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-100, 15-12-101, and 15-12-102.
5
injury to the p1aintiff...This kind 'of individualized injury seems similar to the injuryinfact
required federally...nothing in this opinion should be understood to undermine in any way our
longstanding case law articulating this requirement." Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry
Count); Bd. 0f Comm 'rs, 315 Ga. 39, 54 n.13 (2022) (collecting cases). "Standing to challenge a
statute on constitutional grounds in Georgia depends on a showing that the plaintiff was injured in
some way by the operation of the statute or that the statute has had an adverse impact on the
plaintiffs rights." Mason v. Home Depot USA, Ina, 283 Ga. 271, 273 (1) (2008) (citations
omitted). Even in the possibly more permissive context-of First Amendment challenges (which the
Movants do not make here), litigants cannot "make facial attacks upon entire statutory schemes
and provisions by- which they were not hanned 'as applied' or harmed by 'running afoul' of the
provision." Granite State Outdoor Adven, Inc. v. City ofRoswell, 283 Ga. 417, 421, (1) (2008).
Neither of the Movants can satisfy the standing requirements articulated by the Georgia
Supreme Court. Their arguments reveal no individualized injury or injury-in-fact. Instead, the
Movants submit arguments that, if anything, argue that certain other parties may have standing to
challenge the special purpose grand jury statutes. The Movants only arrive at an injury to
themselves through a daisy chain of cause: and effect: if other parties could articulate individualized
injuries to themselves, this could affect the administration of the grand jury or the creation of its
final report. If the final report is affected, it is possible that individuals named in the report could
be affected. If the Movants are among the individuals named in the report, then their due process
rights could possibly be injured. The individualized injury requirement prevents exactly this kind
of attenuation.
The Movants' explanations for their own standing are disconnected from the actual '
arguments they provide in support of a finding of unconstitutionality. Mr. Trump asserts that he
6
has been "inextricably intertwined with this investigation since its inception" in early 2021, also
observing that he participated in the event which precipitated the investigation, a phone call in
January of 2021. Mtn. at 11. However, as he acknowledges, he was never a witness before the
SPGJ. Mrs. Latham suggests that she has standing because she was identified as a "target" of the
investigation." Latham Mtn. at 2. She, too, never testified. Despite this, nearly all of the grounds
identified by the Movants for challenging the constitutionality of the statutes involve their
application to, and effects upon, the rights of actual witnesses. See Mtn. at Part III.A.i,_ Part III.B,
Part III.C. The only remaining grounds identified by the Movants address vagueness as to the
administration of the SPGJ and the issuance of its final repert. See Mtn. at Part III.A.ii. Even if a
party is named in a SPGJ final report, that does not mean the party is injured by the statute
describing the report's creation. If the statutes were vague in the regards suggested, the parties
suffering actual injury would be the supervising judge and the grand jurors, who would be left
without guidance as to how they should govern themselves in discharging their duties under the
law. Because the Movants' arguments do not demonstrate individualized injuries or injuries-in-
fact rather than injuries-inconjecture, they lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
pertinent statutes.
B. Vagueness
The Movants argue that the statutes governing special purpose grand juries are
unconstitutionally vague in two ways: because they do not specify whether the nature of SPGJs is
civil, criminal, or both; and because the statutes- are vague about the "contents and release" of the
SPGJ's final report. Neither argument is persuasive.
6
As discussed below, being named as a "target" does not alter one's rights before a special purpose
grand jury, particularly when one does not testify before such a grand jury.
Beginning with the "nature" of SPGJs, O.C.G.A § 1512-100(a) is clear that, similarly to
"regular" grand juries, SPGJs are authorized to investigate "any alleged violation of the laws of
this state or any other matter subject to investigation by grand juries as provided by law." The
authorization is clearly broad, but just because a statute is broad does not mean that it is vague. It
follows, naturally, that if regular grand juries are authorized to investigate both civil and criminal
matters, then a SPGJ is as well. In State v. Lamp], 296 Ga. 892, 89596 (1) (2015), the Supreme
Court acknowledged that SPGJs can investigate criminal matters. Lamp] also established that 'a
SPGJ is bound by the law and by the scope of its authority described in its impaneling order; the
order in that case authorized a criminal investigation. Id. As this Court has previously found, the
SPGJ- in this case was requested by the District Attorney, impaneled specifically to investigate
criminal activity, and authorized to provide recommendations for criminal charges. All of this
comported with the clear language of the statute authorizing investigations into any alleged
violation of Georgia law.
In response, the Movants cite only the arguments of prosPective SPGJ witnesses who
moved to quash their SPGJ subpoenas. They cite to In re Jacki L. Pick, WR94, 066-01 (Tex. App.
2022), involving witness Jacki Pick's motion to quash her out-ofstate subpoena in Texas, as well
as efforts by Governor Brian Kemp and Senator Lindsey Graham to have their subpoenas quashed
on grounds of sovereign immunity. Not one of these efforts produced a decision on the merits
declaring that SPGJs are necessarily civil rather than criminal. Ms. Pick's subpoena was quashed
on procedural grounds, and the concurring opinions attached to the decision in her case likely say
more about the application of the law in Texas than they do in Georgia. This is because In re Pick
was the only case where any judge expressed opinions that Georgia's SPGJ investigations might
only be civil rather than criminal in nature. Every other court, in multiple states, which opined
8:
upon the nature of. the SPGJ determined that it was conducting a criminal investigation and
authorized to summons witnesses under the Uniforrn Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
from Without the State. See O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 et seq. Such unanimity indicates clarity rather
than unconstitutional vagueness of some kind. Additionally, neither Governor Kemp nor Senator
Graham were successful in their attempts to persuade courts that the SPGJ was civil; this Court
determined the investigation was clearly criminal, and the Northern District of Georgia dismissed
Senator Graham's arguments as "unpersuasive. and unavailing." See In re Jury, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146741, *20-21. To the-extent that any conclusion can be drawnfrom the litigation arising
from this matter, it is not that the statutes are too vague in determining whether a SPGJ can be of
a criminal nature.
The Movants also assert that the statutes are impermissibly vague regarding the creation,
contents, and release of the SPGJ's final report. However, the statutes arficulate requirements for
the final report which negateany suggestion of impermissible vagueness or possible violations of
due process. A SPGJ's final report must indicate that it has completed the investigation authorized
in its impaneling order, and it must do so to the satisfaction of the supervising judge and a majority
of the jurisdiction's Superior Court bench. See O.C.G.A. § 15-12-101(b). Again, this means that a
SPGJ-'s authority to craft the report is= broad, but it does not follow that it is unconstitutionally
vague, and the requirement that not one but several judges must approve the dissolutionof a SPGJ
ensures that fundamental fairness is maintained. While the statute is flexible (a necessity, given
the broad mandate afforded to grand juries), it does not contain an "insufficient objective standards
and guidelines to meet the requirements of due process" Jelgzll Island State Park Civic Auth. V.
Jekyll Island Citizens Ass 'n., 266 Ga. 152, 153 (1996).
C. As Applied
Finally, the Movants argue that the statutes governing SPGJS are unconstitutional as
applied in this case. These arguments all involve the rights of witnesses who might come before
the SPGJ, so again, the Movants lack standing to challenge the statutes on such a basis. In any
event, the application of the statutes in this matter does not demonstrate a constitutional deficiency
of any kind.
In making this argument, the Movants first turn again to their insistence that the SPGJ can
only be civil in nature. They cite Kenerly v. State, 311 Ga. App. 190 (2011) and State v. Bartel,
223 Ga. App. 696 (1996) and attempt to demonstrate that this Court's prior rulings distinguishing
Kenerly and Bartel from the present matter were made in error. Mtn. at 2223. The problem for
their. argument remains that Kenerly mischaracterizes the holding in Bartel and that nowhere does
Bartel indicate that SPGJs can conduct only civil investigations. This is precisely what this Court
previously found. See Mtn. Exhibit 10 at 3-4. To hold otherwise would be to determine that SPGJs
are empowered to conduct investigations of alleged crimes, but only as civil bodies. Such an
interpretation makes no sense.
Movants additionally argue that the statutes are unconstitutional as applied because, in
finding that the SPGJ was a criminal body, this Court authorized it to subpoena out-ofstate
witnesses. This argument is unavailing because the SPGJ was clearly criminal in nature, but also
because there can be no due process concerns whatsoever. Witnesses subpoenaed from out of state
had their subpoenas reviewed by two separate courts, including one in their home jurisdiction. If
summoned, they were then able to invoke the Fifih Amendment or consult with an attorney at any
time. Where the various requirements of the Uniform Act were followed (and Movant does not
contend otherwise), there can be no due process violation to any outofstate witness, much less to
non-witnesses such as the Movants.
10
Finally, the Movants argue that the statutes were unconstitutional as applied because some
individuals Were named as "targets" of the SPGJ investigation and because witnesses' Fifih
Amendment rights were insufficiently protected. These arguments are unpersuasive because the
term "target" has no constitutional significance in Georgia. The Supreme Court has held that a
"target" can be summoned to a SPGJ so long as they are afforded the right to invoke the Fifth
Amendment as any witness would. Lampl, 296 Ga. at 298-99. The Movants' arguments as to the
status of "targets" thus cannot demonstrate a constitutional problem. Regarding the application of
the Fifih Amendment in the SGPJ, the Movants provide only suppositions, as is discussed below,
and certainly nothing demonstrating an injury to either of them.
The Movants provide a litany of arguments but. cannot connect them to an actual injury,
actual vagueness, or actual as-applied constitutional issues. As a result, their arguments must fail,
and this Court should dismiss or deny their Motions as appropriate.
III. The Movants fail to demonstrate that the District Attorney's Office should be
disqualified because they either repeat prior unsuccessful arguments, submit
inadequate grounds for disqualification under Georgia law, or ask this Court to
adopt inapplicable standards.
The Movants next argue that the FCDAO "must be recused, disqualified, and prevented
from any further investigation or prosecution of this matter." Mtn. at 31. This severe remedy is
required, Movants insist, for three reasons: the Supervising Judge should have disqualified the
FCDAO in July of 2022; the District Attorney has committed "forensic misconduct" by making
public comments related to the investigation; and three of the District Attorney's social media
posts on Twitter have created an "appearance of impropriety" severe enough to require
disqualification. The Movants' arguments are untimely, improperly brought, and without merit,
and they should be dismissed or denied as appropriate.
ll
To begin with the untimeliness of the M'ovants' arguments, the Motion cites to hearings,
statements, and social media posts made months or even years ago, in some instances referencing
comments made before the SPGJ had even been impaneled. See Mtn. at 3 8 fn.24. And yet, as noted
above, Mr. Trump asserts that he has been "inextricably intertwined with this investigation since
its inception" in early 2021, also observing that he participated in the event which precipitated the
investigation, a phone call in January of 2021. Mtn. at 11. By his own- estimation, Mr. Trurnp has
been at the center of an investigation which has progressed for over two years, but only now is he
moving for the prosecutor's disqualification. To the extent that Mrs. Latham's arguments
regarding disqualification are not barred by res judicata (discussed below), her remaining
arguments are untimely as well. I
If any of the elements put forward by Mr. Trump in his Motion (the disqualification of the
FCDAO regarding Burt Jones in July of 2022, the District Attorney's statements to the media in
2021 and 2022, or the "appearance of impropriety" created by Twitter posts in July of 2022) were
the egregious grounds for disqualification which he asserts they are, he had a duty .to raise them to
the Court's attention as soon as he learned of them. "Although we have not considered when a
motion to disqualify a prosecutor based on an alleged conflict of interest should be asserted, we
have held, in other contexts, that such challenges must be raised promptly after the defendant learns
of a potentially disqualifying matter." Reed'v. State, 314 Ga. 534, 546 (4) (2022). The objection
must be raised "without delay, at the first Opportunity after the accused learns of the grounds for
disqualification." Id. (quoting Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 481 (1) (1983)).
Far from raising this issue promptly, Mr. Trump has waited years, until after the conclusion
of an entire SPGJ investigation, when the FCDAO's own investigation has moved into its latter
stages. Mr. Trump could have pursued the disqualification of the F CDAO in February of 2021,
12
after the District Attorney made certain cements to which he now objects (Mtn. at 38 fn.24), but
he did not. He also did not do so when the District Attorney requested the impanelment of the
SPGJ, or when the order creating the SPGJ was issued. He might have sought disqualification as
the SPGJ pursued its investigation with the assistance of the FCDAO, but he did not then either.
Mr. Trump did not argue for disqualification when Burt Jones did in the summer of 2022, nor did
he do so when a group of alternate electors (including Mrs. Latham) requested reconsideration of
the denial of their own disqualification motion shortly afterward. Mr. Trump remained silent on
this matter when the Supervising Judge announced the dissolution of the SPGJ, and he chose not
to even attempt to participate in the litigation surrounding' the possible publication of the SPGJ's
final report. Mr. Trump elected to pursue the disqualification of this office only after the FCDAO
announced an investigation in early 2021, pursued it for months, requested the SPGJ in early 2022,
impaneled and advised the SPGJ for the remainder of the year, received its report in early 2023,
and began to litigate the possibility of the report's release. At this latter stage, and after all of these
events occurred without action by Mr. Trump, he now seeks to prevent the FCDAO from "any
further investigation or prosecution of this matter." His request for disqualification should
therefore be dismissed as untimely.
Mrs. Latham, having adopted Mr. Trump's Motion, is now attempting, for a third time, to
disqualify the FCDAO from investigating her. Along with several other alternate electors, she
joined Burt Jones's motion for disqualification in July 2022, which was denied as to her.(see Mm,
Exhibit 4), and she then filed a motion for reconsideration in August of 2022, which was also
denied (see Mtn., Exhibit l3). To the extent that Mrs. Latham, having adOpted Mr. Trump's
arguments regarding disqualification, relies upon facts which should have-been known to her prior
to the filingof her motion for reconsideration in August of 2022, her arguments are untimely. To
13
the extent that, in adopting-Mr. Trump's Motion, she merely restates her prior arguments, she is
barred from raising them again by the doctrine of res judicata.7
If any purported grounds for disqualification remain after dismissing those which are
untimely or barred by res judioata, the Movant's arguments concerning them lack sufficient merit.
The Movants first insist that this Court erred when, even as it disqualified the FCDAO from
investigating or otherwise prosecuting Burt Jones in 2022, it did not also disqualify the FCDAO
from the entire investigation. In its July 2022 Order, this Court explained the focused and specific
analysis required under Georgia law when evaluating motions for disqualification; such- motions
can be based only upon a conflict of interest or "forensic misconduct" relating to public statements,
either of which must have a direct relationship to a specific individual. See Williams. v. State, 258
Ga. 305, 314 (2)(B) (I988). In arguing' that disqualification should extend instead to an entire
matter or investigation, the Movants rely extensively upon a single Supreme Court case, Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fil S.A. et al, 481 U.S. 787 (1987). This case, however, is
inapposite. Young involved a contempt case stemming from private litigation between two parties.
The trial court in Young appointed the attorneys for the plaintiff to act as special prosecutors for a
criminal contempt action against the defendants for activities arising directly from the private
litigation. Id. at 791-92. These "special prosecutors" had an obvious and pervasive conflict of
interest from the very inception of the contempt case, which led the Supreme Court to hold that
"counsel for a party that is the-beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in
a contempt action alleging a violation of that order." Id. at 809.
7
See O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40: "A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive
between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of
law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the
judgment is reversed or set aside."
14
Obviously, such circumstances are not present in this case. Any reliance upon Young for
the contentiOn that disqualification applies to entire matters or investigations rather than individual
defendants is misplaced. When this Court entered its order disqualifying the FCDAO from
investigating Burt Jones, its analysis turned on the nature of the District-Attorney's relationship to
Mr. Jones specifically and explicitly rejected any claims that the District Attorney had a broader
conflict of interest that might have applied to Mrs. Latham (and by extension, Mr. Trump or
others). In Young, the special prosecutors had an inarguable conflict of interest that necessarily
pervaded the entire case, including the facts giving rise to the actual criminal charges at issue. As
it stands, nothing in Young indicates that Georgia's existing framework for the disqualification of
prosecutors is inadequate or was incorrectly applied by this Court previously. The facts have not
changed, and they still do not support the attribution of a finding of conflict of interest as to one
individual to every other individual with some relation to the events surrounding the 2020
elections. Because the Movants rely solely upon Young, their arguments that this Court erred in its
initial rulings on disqualification must fail.
The Movants also assert that the District Attorney has engaged in "forensic misconduct"
by making statements to the media about the investigation. As noted above, forensic misconduct
is one of the two generally recognized grounds for the disqualification of prosecutors. The only
described example of forensic misconduct is "the improper expression by the prosecuting attorney
of his personal belief in the defendant's guilt." Williams, 258 Ga. at 315. It is an exceedingly rare
claim; Williams appears to be the only Georgia case discussing forensic misconduct in any depth.
In Williams, the Georgia Supreme Court adepted a stringentand specific standard for evaluating
claims of forensicmisconduct: "[i]n determining whether an improper. statement of the prosecutor
as to the defendant's guilt requires his disqualification, the courts have taken into consideration
15
whether such remarks were part of a calculated plan evincing a design to prejudice the defendant
in the minds of the jurors, or whether such remarks were inadvertent, albeit improper, utterances."
Id.
Two obstacles to the Movants' claims are immediately apparent under this standard: the
statements to which they cite do not concern the Movants' guilt, and no jury exists in this case.
Nearly every one of the statements contained in Exhibit 5 of the Motion are conditional, vague,
comments regarding "allegations," or general statements aboutthe investigation and the reason for
its pursuit. The one statement which does directly address the District Attorney's Opinion of Mr.
Trump's culpability indicates the direct opposite of forensic misconduct: "FCDA said she has yet
to make up her mind about whether the former president or his advocates broke the law and
reiterates that she will treat President Trump like anyone else who crosses her desk." See Mtn,,
Exhibit 5 at no. 23.
Even if this Court were to determine that there were some statement from the District
Attorney that could be considered improper, which was timely objected to and not subject to res
judicata, the Movants have not (and cannot) show the sort of pervasive misconduct required for
disqualification. The examples provided in Williams indicate the sort of egregious conduct.
required for such a showing. The opinion refers to a Vermont case where a prosecutor was
disqualified for publicly pledging during a reelection campaign to secure a conviction against a
defendant. See id. at 315 n.4; Vermont v. Hohman, 420 A2d 852 (Vt. 1980). In Williams, the
prosecutor flatly stated- his opinion of the defendant's guilt, making a series of comments that
culminated with, "In my Opinion, therefore, there is substantial reason to believe Mr. Williams is
guilty of the offense charged." 258 Ga. at 310. Even then, the Supreme Court held that it was
" uite clear" that the rosecutor's
P comments were "not of such e re ious nature as to re uire
16
disqualification." Id. at 315.8 Disqualification for forensic misconduct in Georgia is-only warranted
by remarks which speak directly to the prosecutor 's opinion of a defendant's guilt and which are
part of a calculated plan designed to prejudice a jury against that defendant, and such remarks
must be egregious. Even if a jury existed in this case, there is absolutely no indication of any such
comments, or any such plan, in the present matter.
The Movants' final argument regarding disqualification moves past the standard for
disqualification under Georgia law and asks that this Court create a new one. The Movants point
to three of the District Attomey's social media posts on Twitter, all made in July of 2022, and
argue that these posts, in combination with their prior arguments, create an "appearance of
impropriety." Mtn. at 4-1. That appearance of impropriety in turn "creates a conflict." Mtn. at 43.
The Movants" arguments on this last point fail for at least three reasons. First, their
reasoning is backward. The "appearance of impropriety" does not create conflict; confiict creates
the appearance of impr0priety. "[A]ppointment of an interested prosecutor creates an appearance
of impropriety that diminishes faitli in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general."
Young, 481 U.S. at 811 (emphasis added). Second, the Movants' argument seeks to import the
"appearance of impropriety" standard for judicial recusal into the possible disqualification of
prosecutors. See Rule 1.2, Code of Judicial Conduct (Judges must avoid "impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety"). However, the standards for prosecutors and judges cannot be
conflated, and courts have intentionally avoided doing so.
[B]ecause of their differing roles and responsibilities, the neutrality required of a-

judge is necessarily of a higher degree than that required of a prosecutor. While the
3
As an example of the sort of "egregious" behavior or plan contemplated by the term "forensic
misconduct," the Williams opinion then cites to Pierce v. United States, 86 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
193 6), a case that involved repeated improper comments before a trial jury in "What appears to
have been a studied effort to inject into the case. irrelevant and prejudicial matter-for the purpose
of influencing the verdict, and its continued repetition after adverse rulings." Id. at 953.
l7
prosecuting officer should seethat no unfair advantage is taken of the accused, yet
he is not a judicial officer. Those who are required to exercise judicial fimctions in
the. case are the judge and jury. The public prosecutor is necessarily a partisan in
the case. If he were compelled to proceed with the same circumSpection as the judge
and jury, there would be an end to the conviction of criminals.
Whitworth v. State, 275 Ga. App. 790, 793 (2005) (citations omitted). See also Young, 481 U.S. at
810-11 ("It is true that we have indicated that the standards of neutrality for prosecutors are not
necessarily as stringent as those applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial officers," and such
standards apply to "whether a conflict is found" in the first place) (emphasis in original). Finally,
the social media activity specified by the. Movants is simply not disqualifying behavior, a reality
which the Movants themselves acknowledge. See Mtn. at 42 (the posts "if standing alone, might
not be sufficient for disqualification"). The Twitter activity consisted of one retweet of a political
cartoon (which involved neither Movant) and two tweets thanking an individual for two tweets of
his own, each of which called for more Twitter users to follow the District Attorney. The Movants
acknowledge that'these facts are so innocuous that they must- be considered "in combination" with,
again, this Court's ruling regarding Burt Jones. This argument, then, is an extension of the
Movants' prior argument: that the Court's ruling regarding Mr. Jones should be applied to the
entire investigation, as well as the social media activity of the District Attorney.
In light of the foregoing, the FCDAO respectfully ask that this Court dismiss or deny the
Movants' Motion for disqualification of the FCDAO. The arguments are largely untimely or barred
by res judicata, and any that survive dismissal fail to demonstrate adequate grounds for
disqualification of prosecutors under Georgia law.
IV. The Movants fail to demonstrate how the SPGJ was "tainted" or how they have
suffered any injury to their due process rights as a result.
The Movants next claim that public comments made by several former grand jurors
demonstrate that the SPGJ was "tainted" by "improper influences, 9, maccurate instructions," and
18
"unconstitutional inferences." Mtn. at '43.. These apparent improprieties thus demand that. this
Court "suppress" the SPGJ's report because otherwise, "named individuals" will suffer violation
of their due process rights. These arguments are also without merit or a basis in the law.
The Motion does not clarify how "improper outside sources" couldhave tainted the SPGJ
process, perhaps because it is not clear what "improper outside sources" could mean in the grand
jury context. It is a basic tenet of grand jury jurisprudence that "the grand jury generally is entitled
to act upon its own information, however acquired." Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 719 (2) (1989)
(citing Groves v. State, 73 Ga. 205 (1884)). Grand jurors are empowered to undertake
investigations on their own initiative and have a statutory duty to "examine or make presentments
of such offenses as may or shall come to their knowledge" either before or after they are sworn.
O.C.G.A. § 15-12-74; see Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 240, 241-242 (2014). This would be impossible
if grand jurors could somehow be "tainted" by information which originated outside the grand jury
room. The Movants argue that the grand jurors were aware of "extraneous" information which was
"beyond their purview," but they do not indicate how or why this is so. The Movants thus
demonstrate only that the grand jurors were aware of "outside" information, not that such sources
of information were somehow "improper."
As to the Movants' arguments regarding the Fifth Amendment, the Movants do not show
or even argue that the grand jury was not instructed on the importance of a witness's right against
self-incrimination. The Movants also do not show how either of them have standing to raise any
challenge related to the Fifth Amendment rights of witnesses before the SPGJ. They merely argue
that, based on a smattering of comments from the former grand jurors, any instruction must have
been inadequate. The Movants acknowledge that, in an interview after the discharge of the grand
jury, a grand juror indicated that prosecutors "repeatedly" told the grand jury that a witness's
19
invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment rights could not be seen "as an admission of guilt." Mtn.
at 46. The grand juror went on to state that prosecutors "were very passionate about saying: 'I need
you to understand that." See Mtn., Exhibit 8 no. 11.
The Movants insist that these comments demonstrate that any instruction regarding the
Fifth Amendment must have been "inadequate on its face." Relying exclusively on Barnes v. State,
335 Ga. App. 709 (2016), they argue that the SPGJ was tainted by misunderstanding and that they
should have been instructed that they could not draw "any inference" from a witness's silence,
rather than merely an inference of guilt. Mtn. at 46-47. This attempt to Split hairs fails, not least of
all becauseit misapplies the holding in Barnes. That case involved a trial court's failure to instruct
a trial jury that it could not "consider in any way" a defendant's decision not'to take the stand in
his own. trial. Notably, the Court of Appeals in Barnes approved of the p're-trial instruction that
"the defendant had the absolute right to remain silent and the jury was not permitted to draw any
inference ofguilt from his exercise of that right," but said that the trial court erred because "those
instructions did not specifically address the issue of Bames's testimony at trial." Id. at 712
(emphasis added). In the present investigation, there is no defendant, no trial, no trial jury, and no
scenario where a defendant opts not to testify. Instead, there are grand quors whom the Movants
acknowledge were instructed "repeatedly" not to infer guilt from a witness's assertion of rights.
On their own terms, the Movants' arguments fail to demonstrate any inadequacies, much less any
that irrevocably "tainted" the SPGJ.
The Movants cannot show that the grand jury was "tainted" by "imprOper" outside
information or inadequate instructions regarding the Fifth Amendment. They do not indicate how
outside information can be improper for a grand jury to perceive. They do not indicate how they
have standing to address the Fifth Amendment rights of others, how the statements contained in
20
their own motion indicate some inadequacy, or how the Barnes case is applicable in this context.
Finally, aside frOm general references to "fimdamcntal fairness," they do not clarify how the
handling of witnesses' Filth Amendment concerns actually gives rise to a violation of their own
due process rights. For all these reasons, their arguments are without merit.
V. The Movants are not entitled to injunctive relief.
Mrs. Latham's Motion also prays that this Court grant her injunctive relief. She requests-
that the SPGJ's report be quashed and that the FCDAO be disqualified, mirroring Mr. Trump's
Motion, but her added request for an injunction is more expansive. Mrs. Latham insists that such
an injunction should reach far beyond the F CDAO, the SPGJ, or the report; the injunction should
prohibit the FCDAO "or any other prosecuting arm of the State" from using "any evidence
presented to the SPGJ in any future grand jury or legal proceeding." Latham Mtn. at 2 (emphasis
'
added). The injunction would require that "any and every state entity be enjoined from presenting
or utilizing any evidence or testimony derived by the SPGJ." Latham Mtn. at 5. In sum, Mrs.
Latham asks this Court to eliminate the report, disqualify the FCDAO, and prevent any other
representative of the people of this State from using any evidence even presented to the SPGJ, in
perpetuity.
This Court must dismiss Mrs. Latham's request for relief because it is plainly without the
power to grant it. O.C.G.A. § 9-5-2 states that "Equity will take no part in the administration of
the criminal law. It will neither aid criminal courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction, nor will it
restrain or obstruct them." Injunctions of criminal investigations are simply not allowed. This
prohibition is explicit, and yet 0.C.'G.A. § 9-5-2 is not mentioned anywhere in Mrs. Latham's
Motion. Because her requested relief is not legal and entirely without merit, this Court must
dismiss it.
21
While Mrs. Latham's Motion is entirely without a basis in the law, it is at least explicit in
what it actually seeks. Mrs. Latham asks that this Court. "restrain or obstruct" not one criminal
investigation, but any criminal investigation. She requests that not one prosecutor be enjoined, but
all prosecutors. In so doing, she notes that her requested relief is identical to that requested by Mr.
Trump in his own Motion: "Both motions seek to enjoin the publication or use of the of the SPGJ
Report and to precludeany State prosecuting agency from presenting or utilizing any evidence or
testimony derived by the SPGJ." Latham Mtn. at 1. While Mr. Trump's Motion avoids use of the
words "enjoin" or "injunction," its procedural awkwardness 'is belied by the succession of standing
and timeliness issues it presents. Functionally, it seeks a single, sweeping remedy, which is the
elimination of the SPGJ's report and any investigation tied to the SPGJ's operation, explicitly or
implicitly. In Mrs. Latham's own estimation, what Mr. Trump's Motion seeks isan injunction.
The Movants cannot succeed because their requested remedies have. no basis in the law
and in fact fly in the face of the orderly administration of the-laws of the State of Georgia. If an
investigation results in actual criminal charges against the Movants, the justice system ensures
they will have no shortage of available remedies to pursue. The general rule set out in O.C.G.A. §
9-5-2 that equity will "take no part in" the Operation of criminal law
is based upon the principle thatequity is intended to supplement, and not usurp, the
functions of courts of law, and that to sustain a bill in equity to restrain or relieve
against proceedings for the punishment of offenses would constitute an invasion of
the courts of law; and on the fact that the party has an adequate remedy at law by
establishing as a defense to the prosecution that he did not commit the act charged,
or that the statute on which the prosecution is based is invalid, and, in case of
conviction, by taking an appeal.
Hodges v. State Revenue Com., 183 Ga. 832, 833 (1) (1937). The Movants are not content to follow
the ordinary course of the law. They seek to "restrain" a criminal investigation before any charges
are filed or even sought; they ask that the judicial system place them above and apart from the
common administration of the criminal law; and they do so by raising arguments for which they
22
have no standing, or which they failed to timely join, or which they have already failed, or which
have no basis in law at all.
The FCDAO respectfully requests that, for all these reasons, the Motions presented by Mr.
Trump and Mrs. Latham be-denied or dismissed as appr0priate.
WHEREFORE, the State of Georgia, by and through Fani T. Willis, District Attorney,
Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Fulton County, Georgia, prays that this Honorable Court dismiss or deny
the instant Motions on the basis of the'papers.
Respectfully submitted this the 15th day of May, 2023,
63a)
FA T. LLIS '
TRICT A RNEY'
Ga. Bar No. 223 955
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
136 Pryor Street Southwest
Third Floor
. McDonal Wakeford
Chief Senior Assistant District Attorney
Ga. Bar No. 414898
Atlanta Judicial Circuit Z'X/rc jj
136 Pryor Street Southwest Ora/Vb
Third Floor
Atlanta, Georgia 303 03
23
Certificate of Service
of May 2023, a true copy of this Response was delivered to
I hereby certify that on this 15th day
the following persons by electronic mail: Drew Findling, Jennifer L. Little, and Kieran J.
Shanahan, attorneys for the movants.
IS
gTRICT ATTORNEY
Ga. Bar No. 223955
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
136 Pryor Street Southwest
Third Floor
24
Exhibit 3
Exhibit 4
Filer ID TransactionTransaction
Amount Date Last Name Contributor City Contributor State Filed Date
5903 7869.1 12/31/2020
5903 9831.49 12/31/2020
5903 10 1/17/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 10 1/17/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 10 1/22/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 2 2/4/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 25 3/10/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 25 5/2/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 50 5/3/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 500 5/17/2022 Kowalski Sterling VA 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 25 5/26/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 5 6/6/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 25 6/17/2022 8/11/2022 15:55
5903 50 7/5/2022 Gonzales San Benito TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/6/2022 delutis orange city FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/7/2022 Newell Washington DC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 1 7/9/2022 Baker Portland OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/11/2022 Barry Puyallup WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/11/2022 feeney Huntington Station NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/11/2022 Helm Colorado Springs CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/11/2022 Pallen Sarasota FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/11/2022 Reich Auburn WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/11/2022 Thomas Corona CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 7.77 7/11/2022 Frost Placerville CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Beckwith Randolph ME 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Bellavigna Phoenix AZ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Brucker Fishers IN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Byerly Walnut Creek CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Cindric Prairie Village KS 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Connelly Boulder CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Foster Las Vegas NV 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Guglielmino Vashon WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Harsh Tecumseh MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Henderson O'Fallon MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Hersh Dallas TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 KODRACK Brighton MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Koval Broomfield CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 McKenna Lewiston ID 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Pogarian Natick MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Schroeder Milwaukee WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/11/2022 Wingfield Winchester CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/11/2022 Abernathy Seattle WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/11/2022 Arden Huntington NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/11/2022 Hutt Columbia MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/11/2022 Saldivar Herndon VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Birnbaum Albuquerque NM 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Breuer Berkeley CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Carrizales Cypress TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Carroll Tucson AZ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Conner Pasadena TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Cornelius Mears MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Donovan Long beach CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Duncan Raleigh NC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Fraker Lovettsville VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Fulton Smyrna GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Gaffey San Diego CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Griffin Boston MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Jeannero Kalamazoo MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Keenan Lee MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Khouri Los Angeles CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Kingston Santa Fe NM 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Krekeler Tomball TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 M James Sagamore Hills OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Marks Jamaica Plain MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Marshall GAITHERSBURG MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 McKenzie Smyrna GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 McNamee Roswell GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Mitchell Binghamton NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Moonan Trumbull CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Morgan Vancouver WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Motes Dallas TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Parkin New York NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Peters Euless TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Peterson Stockbridge GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Ratner Southborough MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Robbins Boerne TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Sadler Smyrna GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Salazar Kingston WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Strickland SNELLVILLE GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Sweeting Columbia MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Trevena Mystic CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Ursetti Suffolk VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Waits San Francisco CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/11/2022 Wilson Milford MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Brown Philadelphia PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Coleman Little Rock AR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Field Tulsa OK 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Hight Washington DC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Jullien Roswell GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Nash Chevy Chase MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Nelson Springfield PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Philips Forestville CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Piper Patterson CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Villa Amethyst LN Osprey FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/11/2022 Webb Laguna Niguel CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 100 7/11/2022 Gilbert Eugene OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/11/2022 Boeth Monteagle TN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/11/2022 Booth Chicago IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/11/2022 Pippenger San Francisco CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/11/2022 Ressin VIENNA VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/11/2022 Weiss Baltimore MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/12/2022 Corley Saint Louis MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/12/2022 Cornelius Fairport NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/12/2022 Roberts Chicago IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/12/2022 Rosenberger Saint Charles MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/12/2022 Vela San Francisco CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/12/2022 Ward El Paso TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 7 7/12/2022 Carpio Seattle WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/12/2022 Christian Milton TN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/12/2022 Connery Petaluma CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/12/2022 D'Surney Richmond VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/12/2022 McNee Staunton VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/12/2022 Rist San Diego CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/12/2022 Ward Henderson NV 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 12 7/12/2022 Terra Alameda CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/12/2022 Burgis St. Louis MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/12/2022 Reece Irvine CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/12/2022 Schultz Columbus OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/12/2022 Ambler Montgomery TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/12/2022 Anderson Redondo Beach CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/12/2022 C LA GRANGE IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/12/2022 Crofts Helena MT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/12/2022 MacKenzie Wall Township NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/12/2022 Ogden Gulf Breeze FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/12/2022 Otto East Dennis MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/12/2022 Pustorino BAYONNE NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/12/2022 Williamson Freeland MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/12/2022 Brennan Woodland Hills CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/12/2022 Cloitre Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/12/2022 E Gross Saint Charles MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/12/2022 Guckenheimer Kirkland WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/12/2022 Petroff San Jose CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/12/2022 Tajima Los Angeles CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/12/2022 Fleischaker Alpharetta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 7/12/2022 Berg San Francisco CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 7/12/2022 Zinghini Centerport NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 1000 7/12/2022 Huvane Encino CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 3 7/13/2022 Lawrence Santa Rosa CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/13/2022 Majeske Highland Park NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/14/2022 Carlin San Diego CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/14/2022 Kirkner Basking Ridge NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 7/14/2022 Ciccolo Reston VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 2 7/15/2022 Davis ATLANTA GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 Bregor Salem MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 Daab Belle Isle FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 Derderian Fairfield Township OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 J Bango High Falls NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 Johnson Mariposa CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 Morse Choctaw OK 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 Stockton New Castle DE 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 taylor auburn WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 Testa TORRANCE CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/15/2022 Tucker Watsonville CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 A Sherman KELSEYVILLE CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Beaudoin-Schwartz Ellicott City MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 BENEDICT Dundee NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Carlo Fresno CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Chadwick Bradford NH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Cicero Tyler TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Clymer Mason OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Coleman Gwynn Oak MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Dickson Ludington MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 DiFeo Sedro Woolley WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Farrelly Indianapolis IN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Feinman Richmond VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Hudson Wayne PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Jurick Honolulu HI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Kelly Bellevue NE 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Knight Rocklin CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Konomos Scottsdale AZ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Majczan Furlong PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Martin Dalton GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Mastrangelo Santa Monica CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Myers Lexington VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Nelson Hillsboro OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 pedley Greenwood Village CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Petrovich Metairie LA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Redsecker North Las Vegas NV 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Reiker Pacifica CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Roberts Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Schill-Brumfield Fresno CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Schwanke Baltimore MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Seiler Oak Lawn IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Stone Emeryville CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Tuckerman Wakeman OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Van Glahn Old Greenwich CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/15/2022 Wilson Denville NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/15/2022 Ewan Millville NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/15/2022 Fristoe Seattle WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/15/2022 GALLAGHER Shevlin MN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/15/2022 Kuppe Rockford IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/15/2022 Vance pasadena TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/15/2022 Willard Middleton WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/15/2022 TORRES Lake Como NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/15/2022 Wagman El Paso TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/15/2022 Ward Chicago IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20.22 7/15/2022 Markos Manhattan IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 A Medina Milwaukie OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Abernathy Pinson AL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Aghayere Lorton VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Allen Worcester MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Basher West Chester PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Batiste Rosharon TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Baughman Sarasota FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Broyles Powder Springs GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Budnick South Windsor CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Bundy Los Angeles CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Carreno Whittier CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Catoggio TEWKSBURY MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Chernick Brooklyn NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Chilvers Ridgefield CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 D'Angelo-Wilson Salem OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Davidson Dallas TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Davis-Theriault Fayetteville NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Dinneen COLUMBUS OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Eddy Minneapolios MN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 elliott Lee's Summit MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Ennis Brookhaven GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Foxworthy Santa Cruz CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Frangiosa Wake Forest NC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Gershon Portland OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Giscombe New York NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Hansen KIRKLAND WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Harris Orlando FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Hessert North Hollywood CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Holcombe Southlake TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Hudson Champaign IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Ivey phoenix AZ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Jenkins Sea Cliff NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Johnson La Quinta CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Kaplan Poultney VT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Karbo Paradise Valley AZ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Keeling Dunlap IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Kimbrough Indianapolis IN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 King Albuquerque NM 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Larson Aliso Viejo CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Le Melle New York NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Leaks Memphis TN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Ledesma Campbell CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Lepard Sherborn MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Libby Chestnut Hill MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Llera Davie FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Long Burbank CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Lunney Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Lustig Houston TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Lyne Cary NC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Mabena Rochester NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 McMahan Newark CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Moran Oak Park IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Murdock Santa Cruz CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Nelson Novato CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Nidle Kent WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Nydick Freehold NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Ortiz Deltona FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Philipson Oldsmar FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Regan Hudson NH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Rider Renton WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Robertson Portland OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Roddy Merrillville IN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Rudolph San Dimas CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Scotton Whiting IA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Serwin Petaluma CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Sivilli Chicago IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Smith Palo Alto CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Sparks Meridian ID 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Spelman Cocoa FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Straka Fairview Park OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Strawderman Midlothian VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Swope Roswell GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Tansey Palm Springs CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Topel Shorewood WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Truitt Mauricetown NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Vassmer Kingston IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Von Herrmann Sonora CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Vukovic Los Angeles CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Weinberg Minneapolis MN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 White Cincinnati OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 wilson ogden IA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Witiak Fayetteville NC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Woods Kittery Point ME 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Wright Marshfield MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Young Pleasant Hill CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Young Kalamazoo MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/15/2022 Younger Aptos CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 30 7/15/2022 Carpentter Freeport ME 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 30 7/15/2022 Dill Herndon VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Barber Port Angeles WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Besch Redmond WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Chun Honolulu HI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Cornell San Jose CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Davis Folsom CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Durkin Milton MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Hansen Beaverton OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Libnic Portland OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Mahala Staten Island NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Mann Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 McLaughlin Sarasota FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Merriman bainbridge is. WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Mitchell Alameda CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Monfre Oak Creek WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Nash Chevy Chase MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Noble Arlington MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Rice San Diego CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Robinson Houston TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Sauter Rancho Mirage MT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Sobon Decatur GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Thackray Louisville CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Thomas Pittsburgh PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/15/2022 Willett Fort Collins CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 100 7/15/2022 Howard Nashville TN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/15/2022 Anstett Lake Forest Park WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/15/2022 Boyle Mercer Island WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/15/2022 Cottle Decatur GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/15/2022 Fontanez Hammond IN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/15/2022 Katis Jackson WY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/15/2022 OWIESNY Chicago IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/15/2022 Shapiro Lodi NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/15/2022 Thomas Santa Monica CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 7/15/2022 Harkins San Francisco CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 7/15/2022 Pfaehler Naples FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 7/15/2022 Watkins Dallas TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 2 7/16/2022 Livesay Kingsport TN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Borrel Middletown DE 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Cingle State College PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Douglas Plano TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Garrett The Colony TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Griffin Millis MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Hess Puyallup WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 HUTTO Lugoff SC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Peterson Sebastopol CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Sachter Bronx NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Schwarz Lockport IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Selgo Goodyear AZ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Sturgis North Las Vegas NV 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/16/2022 Walton Lafayette LA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 7 7/16/2022 Gormley Rehoboth DE 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Ackerman Palo Alto CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Baratta Liberty Lake WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Dawson Concord CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Friedman aventura FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Gibson Prairie Village KS 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Gresham Katy TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Groninger Yorba Linda CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Gross Oceanside NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Hadjithomas Euless TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Harris Madison WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Hinton Van Nuys CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Joslyn North Las Vegas NV 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Kauffman Kirkland WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 King Danbury CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Lezama Laguna Hills CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 lineberger Kannapolis NC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Masielle Peachtree City GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 McClean Davis CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Miani Boston MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Moran Charlottesville VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Rubin Henrico VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Sikora Victorville CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Trock Silver Spring MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Velasquez Sacramento CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Vogel White Lake MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/16/2022 Wiltshire Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/16/2022 Carey Sunnyside NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/16/2022 Georges Culver City CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/16/2022 Gogoleski Portland OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/16/2022 harris spokane WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/16/2022 Markstrom Frederick MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/16/2022 Winn Richland WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/16/2022 Bridle Venice CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/16/2022 Johnson Staten Island NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/16/2022 O'Neil Santa Clara CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/16/2022 Rodriguez Alhambra CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/16/2022 Sheridan Penn Valley PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Aarons San Diego CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Azar Porterfield DEKALB IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Barrett Redmond OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Brocklesby Sunderland MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Brown Germantown MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Buharalija Norcross GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Castillo Saint Louis MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Cauffman Clinton WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Cavalier Sonoma CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Collmer Salt Lake City UT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Cornett Milford OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Coster Kingston NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Crump Madera CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Davis St. Petersburg FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Delahousie Duarte CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Duncan Montclair NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Easton Rutherford NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Fernandez Columbia MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Fries Manorville NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Hedrick St Charles MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Hochman San Francisco CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Honea-Boles Lufkin TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 J Zaber Homewood IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 James Columbus OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Jeffer Los Gatos CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Johansen Stevenson Ranch CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Jones Richmond CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Katz Blue Mounds WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 kelley Lakewood OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Kenner Basking Ridge NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Krieger Winfield IA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Kuderik Birmingham MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Lauer Mechanicsville VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Lee Berkshire NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Levy Royal Oak MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Mason Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 McCarty Vienna VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Miller Darien CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Misra Tuscaloosa AL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Moyer West Hempstead NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 O'Loughlin Fort Lupton CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Resnick Cinnaminson NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Richards Dana Point CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Sanborn Carmichael CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Sanguinetti Portland OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Scherer Biltmore Lake NC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Seville Covina CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Singh Irving TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Smith San Francisco CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Spradlin Macungie PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Starck Payson AZ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Sutter Chicago IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Swain Wells ME 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Taylor Seattle WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Telesco Big Indian NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Thomas Richmond VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Turnbull Milwaukee WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 White San Diego CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/16/2022 Womack Park City UT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Aoki Seattle WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Clay Alpharetta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Darrin Frederick MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 DeShong McLean VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Ducar Benentt Cambridge MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Farley Santa Rosa CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Gernon Northfield MN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Hansen Sacramento CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 hutton Miami FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Johnson Cherry Valley CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Kroninger Berkeley CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Letts Carmel IN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Payton Boulder CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Reed Bartlett TN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Rudd Decatur GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Schall Edina MN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Stern New York NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Switzer Chico CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Unruh Reedley CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/16/2022 Van Dolah Kneeland CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 100 7/16/2022 gale Tarzana CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/16/2022 Archie St. Louis MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/16/2022 g schmidt augusta KS 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/16/2022 Gray New Orleans LA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/16/2022 Schlackman Rochester NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/16/2022 Stephens Austin TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 150 7/16/2022 Murray Carmel Valley CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 7/16/2022 Owens Takoma Park MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 500 7/16/2022 Panitch Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 2 7/17/2022 Gahman Oceanside CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/17/2022 Ader Brooklyn NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/17/2022 Bales Chicago IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/17/2022 Luebkeman Marlborough NH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 7/17/2022 Rodriguez LOS ANGELES CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Anderson Redondo Beach CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Boyd Pensacola FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Haskell Hansville WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Holms Newtown CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Keating Arlington Heights IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Leung Rochester MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Mason Ooltewah TN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 O Liddy Thornton CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Penner Hovland MN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Pluta Valley Village CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Raso Pineville LA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/17/2022 Stelter Waxhaw NC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 7/17/2022 Phelan Los Angeles CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/17/2022 Flynn Los Angeles CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/17/2022 Lemke Milwaukee WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/17/2022 Sweitzer MISSOULA MT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Berg Colorado Springs CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Bicket Barstow CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Brown Campbell CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Burris SEFFNER FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Daniels Manhattan Beach CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Dotson Fallbrook CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 GIBBS Falls Church VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Hairston Baltimore MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Halpin Albuquerque NM 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Hartle Juneau AK 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Henry White Plains NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Herrera Miami FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Isaf-Lauri Montgomery NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Leary Palo Alto CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 M McNagny Jericho NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Matuscak Hudson OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 McLaughlin Delmar NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 ormsbee Maplewood NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Politoski Hillsboro OR 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Segal Beverly Hills CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/17/2022 Suarez Pacifica CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/17/2022 Calvani Philadelphia PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/17/2022 Hoffman Glen Ellyn IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 7/17/2022 Scott Dawson GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/17/2022 Adderly Beverly Hills CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/17/2022 Carter Paterson NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/17/2022 wollman NEEDHAM MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/17/2022 Ytsma Boise ID 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/18/2022 Donaldson Onekama MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/18/2022 Burton South Burlington VT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/18/2022 Saril New rochelle NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/18/2022 Scrushy Carmel NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/18/2022 Tompkins Cherry Hill NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/18/2022 Vernick New York NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 3 7/19/2022 Pilewskie San Mateo CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/19/2022 Alberg Chevy Chase MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/19/2022 Bloom Chatham NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/19/2022 Dobrowits Bayside WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/19/2022 Gaudet Saline MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 7/19/2022 Tinkley Tucker GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/19/2022 Ray Santa Monica CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 500 7/19/2022 Fisher Greenville VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/20/2022 Grisham Gainesville VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/20/2022 D'Aurora Pittsboro NC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/20/2022 Walker Brooklyn Park MN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 7/20/2022 Wolaver New York NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/21/2022 Bourg Lawrenceville GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/21/2022 Morales Richland WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 7/23/2022 Pursifull Snoqualmie WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 7/31/2022 Rudden NY NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 500 8/2/2022 Larche Skokie IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/3/2022 Allen South Ryegate VT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/3/2022 Herman New York NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 8/3/2022 Fraser Nyack NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 8/3/2022 Slack Los Angeles CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/4/2022 Giraud Seattle WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/4/2022 Murray Archer FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/5/2022 McCarthy Stratford CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/5/2022 Potter Las Cruces NM 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 8/5/2022 Miranda Princeton MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/5/2022 Green TUCSON AZ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/5/2022 Kraemer Milwaukee WI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/5/2022 Watson Macon GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/5/2022 Woodley San Jose CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/5/2022 Alder Cathedral City CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/5/2022 Cole West Sacramento CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/5/2022 Morris Chula Vista CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/5/2022 Tenneriello Philadelphia PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 8/6/2022 Winckler BRANDON SD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/6/2022 Thompson Rockaway NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 8/6/2022 Lasko New York NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/6/2022 blasdel butlington VT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/6/2022 Chrzan Huntington MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/6/2022 Kent San Jose CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/6/2022 Yarborough Augusta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/6/2022 Brown Owasso OK 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/6/2022 Carrigan Holly MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/6/2022 Cicchino Maplewood NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/6/2022 Neerman Raleigh NC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/6/2022 Pavelchek Olympia WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 100 8/6/2022 Gardner Orange CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 8/6/2022 Schwartz Somerville MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 3 8/7/2022 Nathan Oakland CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/9/2022 Wallin Phoenix AZ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 30 8/9/2022 Moncried Gainesville FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/10/2022 Schuder gainesville GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/15/2022 Rasch North St Paul MN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 8/15/2022 Rasch North St Paul MN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/15/2022 Long Burbank CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/15/2022 kelley Lakewood OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/15/2022 Mann Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 8/17/2022 Ader Brooklyn NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 8/17/2022 Blood San Jose CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/17/2022 Maclay Richmond CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 8/17/2022 Henderson O'Fallon MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 8/17/2022 Bell Palm Beach Gardens FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/17/2022 Knowles Hallandale Beach FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/17/2022 Marion Putnam CT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/17/2022 Smullin Huntsville UT 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/17/2022 Anton Savannah GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 8/18/2022 GARNER UNINCORPORATED CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/18/2022 Andros Smyrna GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 15 8/18/2022 Johnson Santa Rosa CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 8/18/2022 Brice Owings Mills MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/18/2022 Adams Chatham NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/18/2022 Gingerella ANDOVER NJ 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/18/2022 Jason Saline MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/18/2022 Keefer Piney Flats TN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/18/2022 Kubena Granville OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/18/2022 Sollinger Evanston IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/18/2022 walsh boston MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/18/2022 Willard Fairview TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 8/18/2022 Maylett Bellevue WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 8/18/2022 Goldfarb Wellsville PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 8/18/2022 Laduzinsky Pleasant Hill CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/19/2022 Fisher Oakland CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10.42 8/19/2022 Ashe Fairfax VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/19/2022 Blain Sandia Park NM 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/19/2022 Dinsmore Dayton OH 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/19/2022 Fite Sand Springs OK 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/19/2022 McCusker Glendora CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/19/2022 Sprecher Takoma park MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/19/2022 Lindley Smyrna GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 8/19/2022 Donaldson Chicago IL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 8/19/2022 Saldana New York NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/20/2022 Lingle-Munos Indianapolis IN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/20/2022 Stone Kingston NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 3 8/21/2022 Nemeth Whitelake MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/21/2022 Wiederin Omaha NE 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 8/27/2022 mckinney McLoud OK 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/29/2022 leger church point LA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/29/2022 Congdon Boise ID 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 8/29/2022 Fernandez Columbia MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 8/31/2022 Rudden NY NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 9/2/2022 Charles Aurora CO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 9/6/2022 Kent San Jose CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 9/12/2022 Fogarty Saint Petersburg FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 9/12/2022 Kelley olympia WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 9/12/2022 McKain Saint Petersburg FL 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 1000 9/12/2022 Anagnostis Belmont MA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 9/14/2022 mccoy danville CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 250 9/14/2022 Goldfarb Wellsville PA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 9/15/2022 Long Burbank CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 9/15/2022 Mann Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 9/17/2022 Ader Brooklyn NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 9/22/2022 Battaglia Southfield MI 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 9/22/2022 Schuder gainesville GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 9/24/2022 Douglas Goodlettsville TN 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 9/24/2022 Hanneman Plano TX 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 9/24/2022 Scott Olympia WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 9/26/2022 Stapleton Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 1000 9/27/2022 Fisher Greenville VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 9/30/2022 Rudden NY NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 10/6/2022 Caine Westlake village CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 10/6/2022 Kent San Jose CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 10/13/2022 Scott Olympia WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 10/15/2022 Long Burbank CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 10/15/2022 Mann Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 10/17/2022 Ader Brooklyn NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 10 10/27/2022 Burke Las Vegas NV 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 10/30/2022 Slotter DACULA GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 11/6/2022 Kent San Jose CA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 11/17/2022 Ader Brooklyn NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 5 12/17/2022 Ader Brooklyn NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 3 12/28/2022 Riffle Roswell GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 12/28/2022 Kaminsky Alpharetta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 20 12/28/2022 Mitchell Binghamton NY 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 12/28/2022 Alberg Chevy Chase MD 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 12/28/2022 Alter Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 12/28/2022 Karen Pippin Festus MO 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 25 12/28/2022 Serra Waleska GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 35 12/28/2022 Robertson Floyd VA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 12/28/2022 Brown Decatur GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 12/28/2022 Brown Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 12/28/2022 Colquitt Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 50 12/28/2022 Pavelchek Olympia WA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 12/28/2022 grandhige Tucker GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 12/28/2022 Koblentz Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 101 12/28/2022 Shapiro Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 150 12/28/2022 Lampley Fairburn GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 200 12/28/2022 Lucas Stockbridge GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 500 12/28/2022 Dangerfield Moncks Corner SC 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 1000 12/28/2022 Foland Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 1000 12/28/2022 Foland Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 1000 12/28/2022 Hormozdi Norcross GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 500 12/29/2022 Chadha Smyrna GA 6/29/2023 15:55
5903 1500 12/30/2022 Conney Atlanta GA 6/29/2023 15:55

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Fulton County Superior Court

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

President Donald J. Trump,

A MENDMENT TO P ETI TION FOR W RITS O F M ANDAMUS AND P RO HIBITION

Reassertion of Original Grounds

• Ex. 1: Mot. to Quash Special Purpose Grand Jury Report, Preclude

― Ex. 1-4: Ord. Disqualifying Dist. Att’y’s Off. as to Sen. Jones

― Ex. 1-5: List of Fulton Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Media Appearances

― Ex. 1-8: List of Grand Jury Foreperson’s Media Appearances;

― Ex. 1-9: List of Supervising J.’s Media Appearances;

― Ex. 1-13: Ord. Den. Mot. to Recons. Disqualification Req. (Aug.

― Ex. 1-14: Cert. of Material Witness Pursuant to the Unif. Act to

― Ex. 1-15: Cert. of Material Witness Pursuant to the Unif. Act to

― Ex. 1-16: Ord. Entering Portions of the Special Purpose Grand

• Ex. 2: State’s Resp. to Mot. (May 15, 2023); and

• Ex. 3: Br. of Media Intervenors in Supp. of the Pub. Filing of the

• Ex. 4: Campaign finance disclosures.1

Attorney filed her 2022 campaign disclosure report.

(a) In Young, a federal district presiding over a trademark dispute

(c) “Regardless of whether the appointment of private counsel in this case

s:\ Drew Findling

s:\ Marissa Goldberg

s:\ Jennifer Little

Counsel for President Donald J. Trump

President Donald J. Trump,

Hon. Robert McBurney

s:\ Drew Findling

III. THE GEORGIA STATUES AUTHORIZING THE USE OF A SPECIAL

A. The Statutes are Unconstitutional Due to Vagueness……………………………15

i. The Statutes Are Vague as to Whether the SPGJ is a Civil or

B. The Statutes are Unconstitutional As Applied to This SPGJ……….……………21

i. The Supervising Judge Improperly Designated the SPGJ as a

ii. The SPGJ Improperly Compelled the Appearance and Testimony

C. The Statutes were Unconstitutionally Applied to this SPGJ if Classified as

i. The FCDA’s Arbitrary Use and Subsequent Abandonment of

ii. Jurors Improperly Drew Adverse Inferences from Witnesses’

IV. THE FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE MUST BE

B. The FCDA’s Public Statements Violate Prosecutorial Standards, Constitute

ii. The FCDA’s Online Activity Violates Prosecutorial Standards

V. THE PUBLIC COMMENTS MADE BY THE FOREPERSON AND GRAND

VI. THE SUPERVISING JUDGE VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES

A. The Supervising Judge Made Prejudicial Statements Regarding Witnesses’

Exhibit 8: List of Foreperson’s Media Appearances.

Exhibit 9: List of Supervising Judge’s Media Appearances.

FCDA’s Office in their letter to the Court which specified:

lawful administration of the 2020 elections in the State of Georgia. Ex. 2.

that this SPGJ would be without authority to return an indictment. Id.

Ex. 4 at 3, see also Ex. 5.

over this pending matter. Ex. 9.

the Supervising Judge.3

Amendment and sovereign immunity.

foreperson’s public comments in and of themselves likewise violate notions of fundamental

review by the Chief Judge of the Fulton County Superior Court.

unconstitutional statute, through an illegal and unconstitutional process, and by a disqualified

Supervising Judge commanded and commands this result.

innuendo accused him of malpractice).

State Brad Raffensperger. 6

each of her interviews:

make these constitutional, legal, and procedural challenges.

III. THE GEORGIA STATUTES AUTHORIZING THE USE OF A SPECIAL

criminal and non-criminal, legislative, administrative, or governmental recommendations.8 Since

grand jury statutes.

A. The Statutes Are Unconstitutional Due to Vagueness.

indefinite, as it contained “insufficient objective standards and guidelines to meet the